Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Response and Reaction in the Federal Judiciary by Neely, Alfred S., IV
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 2 Winter 1985 Article 3
1985
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Response and
Reaction in the Federal Judiciary
Alfred S. Neely IV
University of Missouri School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neely, Alfred S. IV (1985) "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Response and Reaction
in the Federal Judiciary," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 14: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol14/iss2/3
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. V. NATURAL 
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.: RESPONSE 
AND REACTION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
Alfred S. Neely, IVt* 
In Vermont Yankee, The United States Supreme Court es-
tablished a paradigm for judicial review of administrative agen-
cies' rulemaking actions. The Court held that Congress had 
established the maximum procedures that may be required of an 
agency undertaking informal rulemaking. These procedural re-
quirements were established by section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and courts generally are prohibited from impos-
ing additional procedures upon agencies. Since the 1978 opinion 
was handed down, the lower federal judiciary has been exploring 
the possible implications of the Vermont Yankee rule. The au-
thor surveys the lower court opinions, and concludes that this 
lower court exploration has produced two results. First, lower 
courts can sidestep Vermont Yankee in three ways: by use of 
their power to substantively review the rulemaking record, by re-
fusing to accept agencies' characterization of some rules as ex-
empt from the notice and comment requirements of section 553 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, and by developing the "con-
stitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances" 
exception which the Court explicitly created in Vermont Yan-
kee. The author calls upon the Supreme Court to close these 
paths of escape from the Vermont Yankee mandate by acting to 
more finely develop the precise nature of the judiciary's role in 
the review of informal rulemaking. Second, the author notes 
that the lower federal judiciary has improperly extended applica-
tion of Vermont Yankee to review of agency adjudication, and 
asks the Court to clarify its stand on the relationship between 
Vermont Yankee and administrative action beyond the sphere of 
administrative rulemaking. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion 
in the case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. 1 The Court's decision reversed two prior rulings of 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,2 triggered ex-
tensive commentary in the legal literature,3 and apparently declared an 
end to a species of judicial activism in the review of agency rulemaking.4 
Vermont Yankee was immediately recognized as an important case with 
at least prospects of significant impact. 5 
The purpose of this article is to consider the response and reaction 
of the lower federal judiciary to Vermont Yankee. Today, six years after 
the Court's decision, sufficient time has passed to discern something 
about the nature and quality of that response and reaction. This in turn 
affords the opportunity to assess the efficacy of the Court's leadership in 
judicial review of administrative rulemaking. 
II. VERMONT YANKEE 
A. The Decision 
Vermont Yankee arose out of the technically complex and politically 
volatile issue of licensing nuclear power facilities. The corporation had 
successfully obtained the requisite construction and operating licenses 
from the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission);6 in granting the 
licenses the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board had refused to consider 
1. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
2. Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
3. See generally infra text accompanying notes 23-40. 
4. See generally infra text accompanying notes 6-22. 
5. The number of casebooks in administrative law which now include Vermont Yankee 
provides some evidence of consensus on the significance of the case. See, e.g., S. 
BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 516-
22 (1979); W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192-201 
(7th ed. 1979); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 53-61 (Supp. 1980); D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 372-78 (1981); B. 
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 289-95 (2d ed. 1983). 
6. In 1974 the licensing and other regulatory activities of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reor-
ganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233. 
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issues pertaining to the spent fuel cycle, and specifically, fuel reproces-
sing and disposal of reprocessing wastes. The Natural Resources De-
fense Council (NRDC) objected to this; however, the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Appeal Board, the administrative appellate tribunal with the 
responsibility for reviewing the initial decision, affirmed the grant of 
license. 7 
Nevertheless, the Commission did not ignore the issue of spent fuel 
disposal. Shortly after the decision concerning Vermont Yankee's li-
cense, it initiated a rulemaking proceeding to consider the subject.8 It is 
noteworthy that in this proceeding the Commission did not limit proce-
dural opportunities to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).9 Under the APA, informal rulemaking is required to be 
conducted in accordance with certain basic and relatively simple proce-
dural requirements. The statute provides that "[g]eneral notice of pro-
posed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register ... " and 
that "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation."IO Fur-
thermore, it requires that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter 
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose."ll The nature of this pro-
cedural pathway has resulted in its characterization as "notice-and-com-
ment" rulemaking. 
These were the basic procedural requirements that the Commission 
elected to exceed in its spent fuel disposal rulemaking proceeding. 
Although not required, the Commission held a hearing. In advance of 
the hearing it made certain background documents available to the pub-
lic, and announced that participants would be given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present their positions and, time permitting, oral as well as 
written statements. In addition, it indicated that a transcript would be 
available and that the record would be open for a thirty day period for 
filing of supplemental statements. 12 In these and other respects, the pro-
cedural opportunities afforded interested persons went far beyond the 
provisions of the AP A. 
Nonetheless, there was dissatisfaction with the procedures employed 
because the Commission had refused the request of the NRDC that adju-
dicatory procedures be utilized, and especially the request that cross-ex-
amination and discovery be allowed.13 Consequently, the NRDC turned 
7. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 526-28 (1978). 
8. [d. at 528-30. 
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982). 
10. [d. § 553 (a)-(c). 
11. [d. § 553(c). 
12. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 528-30 (1978). 
13. [d. at 529. 
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to the judiciary for review of the Commission's rulemaking procedure as 
well as other issues surrounding the licensing of the Vermont Yankee 
facility. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
decided whether the rulemaking procedures used were legitimate and ad-
equate. 14 The court concluded that the proceeding was procedurally de-
fective, notwithstanding compliance with the basic requirements of the 
AP A, and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceed-
ing. ls The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
court of appeals's decision. The Court was motivated by its "concern 
that they had seriously misread or misapplied . . . statutory and deci-
sional law cautioning reviewing courts against engrafting their own no-
tions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive 
functions by Congress."16 The lower court's determination of the inade-
quacy of the Commission's rulemaking procedures violated the Supreme 
Court's perception of basic principles governing the relationship between 
administrative agencies and the jUdiciary. It noted: 
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the 
exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally 
not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant 
them. This is not to say necessarily that there are no circum-
stances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency 
action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those 
required by the [APA]. But such circumstances, if they exist, 
are extremely rare. 17 
Consequently, the Court rejected the NRDC's contention that the proce-
dural requirements of the AP A for informal rulemaking constitute only 
"lower procedural bounds" which a court may require an agency to go 
beyond "when an agency's proposed rule addresses complex or technical 
factual issues or 'Issues of Great Public Import'."ls 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was not suggesting that lower 
courts were to do nothing in the control of administrative rulemaking. 
Among other things, there remained the matter "of whether the chal-
14. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
15. Whether the court of appeals mandated additional procedures beyond those re-
quired by § 553 of the APA is open to debate. The Supreme Court found that it 
had, noting "we conclude that while the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the 
majority of the court of appeals struck down the rule because of the perceived inade-
quacies of the procedures employed in the rulemaking proceedings." Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
540-41 (1978). 
16. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). 
17. [d. at 524. 
18. [d. at 545. 
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lenged rule finds sufficient justification in the administrative proceedings 
that it should be upheld by the reviewing court,"19 subject to the 
Supreme Court's warning that the lower courts should "not stray beyond 
the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon 
the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to 
further some vague, undefined public good. "20 
The relative clarity of the Court's pronouncement was nevertheless 
clouded by its suggestion that there might be circumstances in which a 
court could insist on added procedures in informal rulemaking, and the 
ambiguity of the suggestion itself created further uncertainty. 
In prior opinions we have intimated that even in a rulemaking 
proceeding when an agency is making a 'quasi-judicial' deter-
mination by which a very small number of persons are 'excep-
tionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds,' in some 
circumstances additional procedures may be required in order 
to afford the aggrieved individuals due process. . . . It might 
also be true, although we do not think the issue is presented in 
this case and accordingly do not decide it, that a totally unjusti-
fied departure from well-settled agency procedures of long 
standing might require judicial correction.21 
Yet the Court definitely had infrequent exceptions in mind, for it noted 
that "[t]his much is absolutely clear: Absent constitutional constraints 
or extremely compelling circumstances the 'administrative agencies 
should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue 
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multi-
tudinous duties.' "22 
B. Scholarly Reaction 
Legal commentary on Vermont Yankee appeared soon after the 
Supreme Court's decision. These writings represent part of the intellec-
tual climate in which the responses and reactions of the lower federal 
courts to Vermont Yankee have unfolded. They provide an indication of 
perceptions of the case, its meaning and significance, its desirability and 
its possible, if not probable, impact. 
An early and important symposium, Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspec-
tives,23 appeared in the Harvard Law Review in June, 1978. In it, Profes-
sors Stewart, Byse, and Breyer of the Harvard Law School presented 
their reactions to the decision. 
19. [d. at 549. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 542 (footnote omitted) (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 
134, 143 (1939». 
22. [d. 
23. Vennonf Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: 
Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978). 
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Professor Stewart was unenthusiastic about the result: "[T]he Court 
announced the broad, novel, and important principle that federal courts 
may not, absent extraordinary circumstances, require federal administra-
tive agencies to employ procedural formalities beyond those specified in 
the Administrative Procedure Act . . . or other relevant statutes. This 
principle is unsound."24 This conclusion was founded on the view that 
the prohibition of "innovative judicial imposition of procedural require-
ments beyond those specified by the APA ... "25 drew upon an anti-
quated view of developments in administrative law. Thus, he observed 
that "Vermont Yankee is myopic in denying courts an adequate role in 
adjusting and updating the law, and instead leaving the entire responsi-
bility to Congress and administrators. "26 
Professor Stewart did indicate, nevertheless, that there was a basis 
for mitigation of the adverse implications of the decision. First, he sug-
gested that the "ban on procedural innovation by courts should be read 
as limited to the particular circumstances of generic rulemaking in nu-
clear power regulation, while its rebuking tone should be read more 
broadly to warn lower federal courts against going too far in using novel, 
ad hoc procedural requirements to force reconsideration of agency poli-
cies which judges view as questionable. "27 Furthermore, he thought that 
"the practical effect. . . will be to stimulate continued use of more mod-
erate forms of hybrid procedure" because of the continuing requirement 
of an adequate record for purposes of judicial review,28 with the addi-
tional possibility of "the salutary side effect of leading reviewing courts to 
engage in more open and explicit scrutiny of substantive agency policies, 
rather than resorting to indirect procedural devices to control 
outcomes. "29 
In contrast, Professor Byse saw the case as "a needed corrective to 
an unwholesome trend in the lower federal courtS."30 His support for the 
decision was "powerfully influenced by [his] conception of the respective 
institutional roles and responsibilities of the judiciary, the legislature and 
the administrative .... "31 Professor Breyer was similarly supportive of 
the decision. His principal point of disagreement was with the Court's 
remand of the case; he believed that the Court need not have done any-
thing more than affirm the Commission's decision. 32 
24. Stewart, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1978). 
25. Id. at 1811. 
26. Id. at 1820. 
27. Id. at 1821. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Byse, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat 
Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1978). 
31. Id. at 1930. 
32. Breyer, Vermont Yankee And the Courts' Role In The Nuclear Energy Controversy, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (1978). 
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The ultimate issue presented by Vermont Yankee is the proper 
role of the courts in the debate over nuclear power. Since that 
debate has been lively and effective in the political arena, and 
since one cannot reasonably argue that important health, 
safety, or environmental interests lie on only one side of that 
debate, the courts. . . should play a limited role, affecting as 
little as possible the outcome of that debate.33 
Perhaps the most vehement criticism of Vermont Yankee has come from 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. He observed that" 'the Vermont Yankee 
opinion is largely one of those rare opinions in which a unanimous 
Supreme Court speaks with little or no authority.' "34 In his judgment 
"the main thrust of the opinion is to outlaw new common law that adds 
to the procedural requirements of section 553 of the APA,"35 and this 
runs counter to the reality that most administrative law is judge made 
and ignores a common law that has developed in harmony with the in-
tent and terms of the AP A. 36 His concerns, however, were alleviated by 
his prediction that the principles of Vermont Yankee would prove 
shortlived.37 
Numerous others have commented on the case. Their views are as 
varied as those of the commentators just discussed, and generalization 
concerning them is somewhat hazardous without full development of 
their opinions. Nevertheless, some patterns of perception of the case do 
emerge. 
Many consider Vermont Yankee an important constraint on the 
ability of courts to impose procedural requirements in rulemaking be-
yond those established by Congress in the AP A, and its importance is 
underscored by the judgment that the broad principles of the opinion 
transcend the ambiguities of the possible exceptions which it created. 38 
33. Id. at 1845. 
34. Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH 
L. REV. 3, 17 (quoting K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:37, at 
616 (2d ed. 1978». 
35. Davis, supra note 34, at 10. 
36. Id. at 3, 12. 
37. Id. at 3, 13-16; see Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 471, 480-83 (1980) 
(reviewing K. C. DAVIS, 1 & 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1979». 
38. See, e.g., Bain, Informal Rulemaking: In Quest of Nuclear Licensing Reform, 55 
DEN. L. J. 177, 179,209 (1978) (exceptional circumstances justifying courts' impo-
sition of additional procedures on agencies are rare, especially in nuclear regulatory 
context); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
393,422 (1981) (a "broadside at the procedural creativity of lower federal courts in 
rulemaking cases."); Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contribution of Judge Har-
old Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894,907 (1980) (the case 
"moots the Bazelon-Leventhal debate by holding the courts enjoy no common law 
authority to prescribe procedures, in addition to those required by the Constitution 
or applicable statutes, in the interest of etfectivejudicial review."); Hahn, Procedural 
Adequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking: A Unified Formulation, 30 AD. L. 
REV. 467; 491-92 (1978) (the case "redirects the current of development and possi-
bly terminates judicial development of the law altogether. "); McGarity, Substantive 
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Naturally this view assumes an obedient and willing lower federal judici-
ary.39 Ot!J.ers have been more inclined to discount the ultimate signifi-
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: 
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J. 729, 752 (1979) ("The 
Court rejected Judge Bazelon's 'good procedures ensure good substance' approach 
and implicitly favored Judge Leventhal's more activist 'hard look' approach."); 
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP. Cr. REV. 345, 395-96 ("It would go too far, however, to suggest that Vermont 
Yankee is anything less than a major watershed. It has put to rest the notion that 
the courts have a continuing 'common-law' authority to impose procedures not re-
quired by the Constitution in the areas covered by the AP A. In that sense, at least, 
'hybrid rule making,' under the APA is dead."); Schwartz, Administrative Law 
Cases During 1978,31 AD. L. REV. 123, 127 (1979) (Vermont Yankee "aborted this 
line of cases" creating a trend toward judicial imposition of hybrid rulemaking pro-
cedures); Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegation and Judi-
cial Review, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 208, 215 (the "high bench has been unwilling to 
allow courts to impose requirements upon rulemaking not contained in delegating 
statutes"); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. 
L. REV. 258, 290 (1978) ("But there is little need to speculate on the future of this 
process [hybrid rulemaking] since the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee . .. has 
made it plain that lower courts have no power to expand AP A informal rulemaking 
procedures as part of their function of judicial review."); Note, Administrative Law 
- Reviewing Courts Restrictedfrom Imposing Procedures/or Informal Rulemaking 
Beyond Those Specified in Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act or Other 
Relevant Statutes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 28 CATH. V.L. REV. 411, 422 (1979) (the 
case reflects "the Court's desire to put an end to judicial activism through proce-
dural review."); Note, A Specific Proposal for Hybrid Rulemaking, 7 COLUM. J. OF 
ENV'T. L. 69, 76 (1980) (the case "severely curtailed judicial use of remands to 
encourage agencies to employ procedures beyond those required by the AP A"); 
Note, Judicial Imposition of Rulemaking Procedures on Administrative Agencies: 
The Impact of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 171, 186 (1978) (the case "will have far 
reaching effects on administrative procedure"); Judicial Review 0/ Administrative 
Agency Action - 1) Absent Compelling Circumstances a Reviewing Court May Not 
Require Informal Rulemaking Procedures That Exceed Those Required by Section 
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act - 2) Agencies May Place Reasonable Limi-
tations On The Consideration of Alternatives Proposed Under The National Environ-
mental Policy Act. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 799, 806-07 
(1979) (the case's greatest significance lies in its reversal of the trend, especially 
apparent in the District of Columbia Circuit, toward requiring rulemaking proce-
dures that are more elaborate than those required by section 553 of the APA); Note, 
Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure - Notice and Comment Rulemak-
ing, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 314, 336 ("a strong mandate ... telling the lower courts to 
stop 'meddling' with agency procedures"); cf Beatson, A British View of Vermont 
Yankee, 55 TuL. L. REV. 435 (1981) (recognizes the significance of Vermont Yan-
kee but suggests that its importance may be overestimated by other commentators); 
Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statu-
tory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183, 202-06 (1979) (urging amend-
ment of the AP A to deal with the case, an unlikely event; in the interim pointing to 
the exceptions and remand for inadequate reasons as alternatives); Priew, A French 
View of Vermont Yankee, 55 TUL. L. REV. 465 (1981) (discussing possible reactions 
of French courts to a Vermont Yankee situation); Schoenbaum, A Preface to Three 
Foreign Views of Vermont Yankee, 55 TuL. L. REV. 428 (1981) (presenting the 
British, French, and Japanese reactions to Vermont Yankee.) 
39. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 38, at 396 ("a new tone for the decision of administrative 
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cance of the decision.40 The evidence is ample that there is no consensus 
or clear direction in the legal literature concerning the significance and 
probable future of the principles of Vermont Yankee. The conflicting sig-
nals of the opinion itself in some measure contributed to this; the varying 
views as to the desirability of the Supreme Court's inclinations concern-
ing the proper role of court and agency in rulemaking seem to have pro-
vided the rest. Yet, as all would concede, the true test of the significance 
of the principles of Vermont Yankee awaited subsequent refinement by 
the Supreme Court and their reception in the lower federal judiciary. 
III. RESPONSE AND REACTION IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 
Although the Supreme Court to date has not refined the principles 
of Vermont Yankee in any significant respect, it has on occasion con-
firmed its commitment to its fundamental principles. The case does ap-
pear to be firmly established as a benchmark in the relationship between 
court and agency in the formulation of rulemaking procedure. 
In Crysler Corp. v. Brown,41 the Court noted that in Vermont Yan-
kee it had held that only in cases involving extraordinary circumstances 
would the courts be permitted to impose procedural requirements be-
yond those required under the APA.42 It pointed out that agencies and 
not the courts possess the discretion to afford more than statutorily man-
dated procedures; however, in this case the issue was whether regulations 
that were procedurally defective could have the force and effect of law. 
In this context, the Court observed that the judiciary has both the au-
thority and the duty to make certain that agencies comply with the statu-
tory mandates of the APA.43 
In 1983, the Court again considered Vermont Yankee in the context 
of rulemaking. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources De-
law cases - a tone of judicial restraint and great deference ... if the D.C. Circuit 
deigns to follow it. "). 
40. See, e.g., DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 
VA. L. REV. 257, 316 ("a narrow ruling, despite its stinging language"); Rodgers, A 
Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. 
L. J. 699, 713, 714 (1979) ("The serious implications of Vermont Yankee for hard 
look procedures, nonetheless, are unlikely to materialize;" the case "forbids a nar-
row form of appellate directive that is almost never used, perhaps not even in the 
case under review"); Recent Development, 9 ENVTL. L. 653 (1979) ("Due to the 
conflicting standards provided by the Court, the Vermont Yankee decision is un-
likely to have a major impact on review of rulemaking proceedings."). See also E. 
Gellhorn and Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process'~' An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 
U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (1981) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont 
Yankee, invalidating judicial imposition of special procedures on agency rulemak-
ing, compounds the uncertainty, especially inasmuch as the decision itself has an 
unclear future."). 
41. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
42. Id. at 312. 
43. Id. at 312·13. 
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fense Council, Inc. 44 involved the return to the Court of a case which it 
had remanded for further consideration in the wake of Vermont Yan-
kee.4s On remand, Judge Bazelon concluded that the agency rules in 
question lacked support in the record and were invalid.46 The Supreme 
Court disagreed and found that the agency, in assuming that permanent 
storage of nuclear wastes poses no significant environmental risks, was 
acting within the realm of reasoned decisionmaking.47 Concerning Ver-
mont Yankee, it noted: 
this Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals' decision 
that the Commission had used inadequate procedures, finding 
that the Commission had done all that was required by NEP A 
and the AP A and determining that courts generally lack au-
thority to impose "hybrid" procedures greater than those com-
templated by the governing statutes. 
As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not require 
agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking 
structure.48 
Yet the Court has also restated the point that Vermont Yankee is 
not without limits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the 
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,49 the 
Court concluded that the National Highway Transportation Safety Ad-
ministration had been arbitrary and capricious in rescinding its vehicle 
crash protection standard, and stated: 
Petitioners also invoke our decision in Vermont Yankee [cita-
tion omitted], as though it were a talisman under which any 
agency decision is by definition unimpeachable. Specifically, it 
is submitted that to require an agency to consider an airbags-
only alternative is, in essence, to dictate to the agency the pro-
cedures it is to follow. Petitioners both misread Vermont Yan-
kee and misconstrue the nature of the remand that is in order. 
In Vermont Yankee, we held that a court may not impose addi-
tional procedural requirements upon an agency. We do not re-
quire today any specific procedure which NHTSA must follow. 
Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy al-
44. 462 U.S. 87 (1983), rev'g Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
45. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 964 (1978) 
(mem.); see a/so Long Island Lighting Co. v. Lloyd Harbor Study Group, Inc., 435 
U.S. 964 (1978) (mem.). 
46. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
47. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 
104 (1983). 
48. [d. at 92, 100. 
49. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983). 
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There is some indication that the Court does not intend to confine 
the principles of Vermont Yankee to rulemaking, although it has not fo-
cused on this issue. In Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation,51 the Court 
reemphasized the teaching of Vermont Yankee as "the fundamental ad-
ministrative law principle" that formulation of administrative procedures 
is to be left primarily to the agencies. 52 The case concerned the validity 
of the EPA's administrative summary judgment rules for essentially ad-
judicatory proceedings. Informal rulemaking was not at issue. In a dif-
ferent case, in which the Court reviewed judicial imposition of 
mandatory deadlines on the adjUdication of Social Security disability 
benefits, it declined to reach the contention that the deadlines improperly 
interfered with agency discretion to develop procedures for adjudica-
tion.53 It did conclude, however, that the deadlines constituted an "un-
warranted judicial intrusion," but not explicitly because of impermissible 
judicial interference with agency discretion in choosing procedure. The 
Court instead reasoned that Congressional awareness of the delay prob-
lem and repeated Congressional rejection of deadlines as a solution made 
the judicial imposition of deadlines unwarranted. 54 
The result is that there is no indication of retreat from the principles 
of Vermont Yankee on the part of the Court. The limited picture avail-
able is one of restatement and reassertion. Unfortunately, there also has 
been no development, refinement, or clarification of the ambiguities of 
the opinion. It remains unclear whether the Court intends Vermont Yan-
kee to apply to administrative action other than rulemaking and what is 
the reach of the exceptions to the principles of the opinion. In contrast, 
there has been extensive response and reaction in the lower federal 
courts. 55 
50. Id. at 2870-71. 
51. 445 U.S. 198 (1980). 
52. Id. at 214-15; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 755 
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The scope of our review of the procedures the 
Board uses to accomplish its mission is limited, and the constitutional constraints on 
them are attenuated. Unless the agency goes entirely beyond its statutory mandate, 
violates its own procedures, or fails to provide an affected party due process of law, 
we have no role in specifying what methods it mayor may not use in finding facts or 
reaching conclusions oflaw or policy."); Heckler v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 13, motion 
to vacate denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) (Grant of stay of preliminary 
injunction with instructions that it be evaluated in accordance with "familiar princi-
ples of administrative law" that procedures are to be left to the agencies. The case 
involved agency practices in termination of Social Security disability benefits.); cf. 
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(courts may not interject themselves into matters properly left to agency discretion). 
53. Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249, 2257-58 (1984). 
54. Id. at 2253, 2257-58. 
55. Federal agencies have been predictably enthusiastic and have cited the case to justify 
denials of procedures in excess of those required under the AP A or applicable stat-
utes, including adjudicatory hearings, 48 Fed. Reg. 396 (1983) (CAB), 47 Fed. Reg. 
26,982 (1982) (FDA), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,065 (1981) (FERC), 45 Fed. Reg. 51,520 
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A. The District Courts 
Generally, the reaction in the federal district courts has been one of 
respectful adherence to the fundamental principles and philosophic un-
derpinnings of Vermont Yankee. 56 There is no significant evidence of 
resistance or inclination to disregard Vermont Yankee. Indeed, the dis-
trict courts have tended to transport Vermont Yankee's deference to ad-
ministrative and legislative determinations of procedure from the context 
of informal rulemaking to other forms of administrative action. 
In rulemaking, Vermont Yankee has caused the district courts to 
look to applicable statutes and agency regulations to determine required 
procedures. For example, in a simple case in which the rulemaking was 
informal and the agency elected to do nothing more than that required 
(1980) (CFTA), oral hearings, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,916 (1980) (OSHA), cross-examina-
tion, 45 Fed. Reg. 8509 (1980) (EPA), limits on ex parte contacts, 45 Fed. Reg. 
35,582 (1980) (FCC), and separation of functions, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,694 (1981) 
(FDA). 
Although state courts in interpreting their own APAs are not constrained by 
the case, a number have generally been receptive to its basic outlook. See, e.g., 
Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 379 Mass. 70, 393 
N.E.2d 881 (1979) (Massachusetts law did not contain a provision comparable to 
the AP A's requirement of a statement of basis and purpose and the court was not 
willing to impose one); Northern Plains Resource Council v. Board of Natural Re-
sources & Conservation, 181 Mont. 500, 594 P.2d 297 (1979); Somer v. Woodhouse, 
28 Wash. App. 262, 275, 623 P.2d 1164, 1171 (1981) ("Where an agency is engaged 
in rule making in its purest form, additional procedural devices beyond those re-
quired by the administrative procedures act are not constitutionally required."). 
This phenomenon has not been limited to the general principles of Vermont Yankee. 
Some have given serious consideration to the compelling circumstances and consti-
tutional constraint exceptions. See, e.g., Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of 
Pub. Utils., 383 Mass. 675, 676 n.l, 421 N.E.2d 449, 450 n.l (1981); Tri-State Gen-
eration & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d 
1324, 1331-32 (Wyo. 1979). Reference to and reliance upon the case have not been 
limited to administrative rulemaking. See, e.g., Atwell v. Power Auth., 67 A.D.2d 
365, 380,415 N.Y.S.2d 476, 484 (1979) (burden of proof in certificate of need pro-
ceeding) appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 797, 403 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1980); 
Cannonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Department of Health, 492 Pa. 68, 75,422 A.2d 141, 
145 (1980) (certification of hospital building program). State cases rejecting Ver-
mont Yankee are rare. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Air Resources Bd., 181 
Cal. Rptr. 199, 129 Cal. 3d 682 (1982); see also Haight v. District of Columbia 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 439 A.2d 487, 491-92 (D.C. 1981) (the court was 
"hesitant to second guess" the liquor licensing board's evidentiary rulings if "within 
the bounds of reason"); Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zon-
ing Comm'n, 431 A.2d 560, 565 (D.C. 1981) (written summaries of expert testi-
mony were adequate and in accord with the board's own rules of procedure); 
Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1036-42 (D.C. 1978) (ex parte 
contacts not prohibited); cf Moskowitz, Vermont Yankee in California's Courts, 13 
PAC. L. J. 315 (1982). 
56. The research method employed in this study would not reveal a quiet rebellion 
against the principles of Vermont Yankee. If a court were to ignore the decision, fail 
to cite it and proceed to impose additional rulemaking procedures, the case is likely 
to have fallen through the gap created by reliance on citation of Vermont Yankee. 
Presumably the adversarial process reduces this risk. It seems unlikely that a court 
would ignore a relevant and forceful argument based on Vermont Yankee without 
revealing that fact in its opinion. 
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by statute, notice and comment pursuant to section 553 of the APA suf-
ficed, and the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia consid-
ered its role limited and narrow. 57 Vermont Yankee provides the barrier 
to courts doing more. 58 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York was similarly deferential in a case in which the underlying statute 
required more than simple notice and comment. In Commodity Ex-
change, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 59 the court 
found that more than submission of written comments was required in 
connection with the agency's disapproval of certain commodity exchange 
rules. The basis for this was the statutory "opportunity for hearing" that 
Congress required in rule disapproval proceedings; however, the court 
did not take this to mean that an adjudicatory hearing was in order.6O It 
noted: 
The AP A mandates a trial-type hearing in rulemaking or adju-
dication only when the statute specifies that it be made "on the 
record." Section 5a(12) of the Act contains no such provision. 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has 
clearly instructed, generally agencies should be free to fashion 
their own rules of procedures absent a congressional require-
ment that the hearing be "on the record" . . . . 61 
Nevertheless, on this occasion the court found that the agency had ex-
ceeded the bounds of its procedural freedom in limiting comment to writ-
ten submissions. It held that an opportunity must be afforded for non-
adjudicatory oral presentations on disapproval of the exchange rule; its 
reason was that this was what Congress intended.62 But this was not a 
case of judicially created and imposed procedures in excess of notice and 
comment. It was one of assuring that the agency proceeded as Congress 
intended. 
The influence of Vermont Yankee is particularly evident in cases in 
which Congress has been silent in the sense that the rules in question are 
exempt from AP A notice-and-comment procedure. In Saint Joseph Hos-
pital v. Heckler,63 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana upheld a rule concerning reimbursement for telephones 
used by Medicare patients. One assertion was that the agency had failed 
57. Association of Am. R.R. v. Adams, 485 F. Supp. 1077, 1083-84 (D.D.C. 1978) 
(challenge to adequacy of opportunity to be heard in Federal Railroad Administra-
tion's rulemaking concerning lighting devices on freight trains). 
58. National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 577 F. Supp. 648, 651 (D.D.C. 
1983) ("Absent an express timing provision concerning posting in the statute, the 
court declines to read one in."). 
59. 543 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. N.Y. 1982), affd, 703 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1983) (mem.). 
60. [d. at 1347-48. 
61. [d. at 1348. 
62. [d. at 1352. 
63. 570 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ind. 1983). 
1985] Federal Response to Vermont Yankee 269 
to create a contemporaneous record in promulgating the rule. The court 
rejected this argument "under the dictates of Vermont Yankee,"64 noting 
that this rule was exempt from the APA's requirement of a "concise gen-
eral statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose" that underlies the con-
temporaneous record requirement and that there was no common law of 
administrative procedure that it could invoke to create a record require-
ment.65 Bedford County General Hospital v. Heckler 66 reached the same 
conclusion with respect to the same issue and the same rules. 67 
In rulemaking that is exempt from the notice and comment require-
ment, other district courts have held similarly in connection with other 
requests for added procedures. In Haddon Township Board of Education 
v. New Jersey Department of Education,68 the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that a Department of 
Agriculture rule was interpretative and thus exempt; in light of Vermont 
Yankee it declined "to require any notice and comment procedures on 
the basis of common law notions of fundamental fairness which go be-
yond the APA mandate."69 The United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts found that the AP A's notice requirement was 
inapplicable to a Department of Interior change in its land acquisition 
policy, holding that such notice was "completely voluntarY,"7o and that 
the court was constrained by Vermont Yankee from imposing a notice 
requirement.?! Yet another district court felt Vermont Yankee precluded 
64. [d. at 439; cf Diplomat Lakewood Inc. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 442, 446-47 
(D.D.C. 1978) (the court found the statement of basis and purpose in question suffi-
cient under the APA, citing Vermont Yankee. This is an example of the case's influ-
ence where it need not have been invoked at all.), rev'd, 613 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
65. 570 F. Supp. 434, 437-39 (N.D. Ind. 1983). 
66. 574 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). 
67. [d. at 946. The court stated: 
[d. 
Plaintiffs find a lack of consideration of relevant factors because the regu-
lation was promulgated without a record. Rulemaking relative to benefits 
is exempt from Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements 
.... Plaintiffs, however, argue that there is a constitutional or common 
law requirement for development of an administrative record. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that 5 U.S.c. § 553 'established the maxi-
mum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the 
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.' Ver-
mont Yankee [citation omitted] .... Because the Secretary was exempt 
from rulemaking proceedings, the lack of an administrative record does 
not render the regulation in question arbitrary and capricious. 
68. 476 F. Supp. 681, 698 n.15 (D.N.J. 1979). 
69. [d. at 698 n.15; see also Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. TVA, 462 F. Supp. 464, 
475 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (the court would not require notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing for rules within the "public property" exception under the APA). 
70. Greenwald v. Olsen, 583 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 n.ll (D. Mass. 1984). 
71. [d. Vermont Yankee has assured comparable restraint in judicial review of proce-
dures which attend preparation of environmental impact statements under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. Gloucester County Concerned Citizens v. 
Goldschmidt, 533 F. Supp. 1222, 1228 (D.N.J.), affd, 677 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982); 
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prohibition of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, noting that 
"[w]hile such ex parte comments seem highly inappropriate, they do not 
appear to be prohibited under the Administrative Procedure Act 
•••• "72 The prevailing philosophy is that it is "not the role of the 
Court to impose a particular decision-making process on an agency 
where none has been provided by Congress."73 
The district courts have not ignored the possible exceptions noted in 
Vermont Yankee, which would allow judicial imposition of additional 
procedures in rulemaking in cases of "constitutional constraints or in ex-
tremely compelling circumstances .... "74 On one occasion, a district 
court rejected the argument that because an agency is entitled to require 
more procedural steps than even its own rules demand, the discretion to 
require more is not reviewable. Although it conceded that "Vermont 
Yankee lends support to this position" and requires judicial deference, 
that deference is not absolute. Before deciding that deference is appro-
priate, a court has the duty to determine whether either of the exceptions 
applies.75 
Although they acknowledge the possibility of exceptions to the gen-
eral Vermont Yankee rule, the district courts have yet to encounter a case 
jutifying application of an exception. For example, one issue in Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp. v. TVA 76 was whether the court would be justified 
in imposing publication requirements on timetables for TVA Board meet-
ings. It found that there were no established timetables and none had 
become established practice; therefore, the court could not justify inter-
vention on the basis of Vermont Yankee's exception for deviation from 
longstanding and well established practices,?7 In Women's Health Serv-
ices, Inc. v. Maher,18 the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut observed that although the plaintiff had not argued an ab-
sence of procedural due process, the argument would fail because the 
Constitution does not require a hearing in rulemaking, and the exception 
in Vermont Yankee is not available when, as in this case, the rule is of 
"broad applicability. "79 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 504 F. Supp. 314, 325 n.40 (D. Conn. 
1980); Committee Against R.R. Relocation v. Adams, 471 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. 
Ark. 1979). 
72. McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 498 F. Supp. 194, 205 
(D. Wyo. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1981). 
73. Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635, 644 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 716 F.2d 56 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
74. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 543 (1978). See generally supra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
75. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 553 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (C.D. Utah 
1982). 
76. 462 F. Supp. 464, 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1978). 
77. Id. at 475. 
78. 514 F. Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 1981). 
79. Id. at 270-71 n.2. 
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Saint Joseph's Hospital Health Center v. Blue Cross 80 is another dis-
trict court case that illustrates the probable outcome when the Vermont 
Yankee exceptions are invoked. It involved an unsuccessful challenge to 
Medicare rules authorizing disclosure of cost reports filed by participat-
ing hospitals. Although it was determined that the rules were promul-
gated in accordance with applicable AP A procedures, the "plaintiff 
nonetheless urge[d] this Court to impose additional procedural require-
ments after the fact because the minimum requirements fixed by Con-
gress did not ensure mature consideration of the interests at stake."81 
The court declined and adhered to the basic principle that agencies 
should be left to fashion their own rulemaking procedures. In the pro-
cess it refused to consider this a case of extremely compelling circum-
stance, noting "the United States Supreme Court's repeated warning that 
the complexity or importance of the issues under consideration will not 
alone justify ex post facto judicial interference with agency rulemaking 
procedures. "82 
This does not mean, however, that the district courts' acceptance of 
Vermont Yankee has caused them to conclude that there is little for them 
to do in review of rulemaking. It does not mean that Vermont Yankee 
need only be cited and the courts will defer. In an action against the 
Corps of Engineers to prevent flooding of a Mississippi River floodway, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri de-
scribed its scope of review as follows: 
[I]n determining whether proper procedures have been fol-
lowed by the agency, this Court is mindful that absent constitu-
tional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances, 
administrative agencies should be free to fashion their rules of 
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permit-
ting them to discharge their very important duties, subject to 
the statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.83 
Yet the court still found that the agency's action was invalid rulemaking 
for failure to afford notice and comment.84 What the court was perform-
ing was the obvious task of assuring that the statutory procedures Con-
gress intended to require were afforded by the agency, a judicial role fully 
consistent with Vermont Yankee principles. Other district courts have 
taken a similar approach in concluding that notice-and-comment proce-
dures were required85 or that the statement of basis and purpose was 
80. 489 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
81. Id. at 1061. 
82. Id. at 1061-62; accord Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Duncan, 499 F. Supp. 672, 680 
(D. Or. 1980) (challenge to rate increase of Bonneville Power Administration). 
83. Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1983), rev'd, 732 F.2d 1375 (8th 
Cir. 1984). 
84. Id. at 514-15. 
85. Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 543 F. 
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inadequate. 86 
A striking aspect of the history of Vermont Yankee in the district 
courts is their inclination to apply its basic principles beyond the context 
of informal rulemaking. A statement that "it is significant that the Ver-
mont Yankee case [is] concerned with agency rulemaking which, in this 
Court's view, is not comparable to the situation at hand"87 is exceptional. 
The norm has been to invoke, apply, and expand Vermont Yankee to 
other forms of administrative action. 
Becker v. Blum 88 represents an intermediate point in this transition 
of the Vermont Yankee rule from application to rulemaking to applica-
tion to other forms of administrative action. In Becker, Medicaid benefi-
ciaries had challenged the notice required under the New York Social 
Services Law and the regulations by which that law was implemented. 
In defense, the state agency challenged the validity of federal regulations 
that governed state notice to recipients; it argued that the rules were arbi-
trary and capricious in requiring notice.89 The procedures by which the 
rules were promulgated were not at issue. The argument concerned the 
desirability of notice in adjudicatory proceedings, and the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York found: "The fed-
eral regulations are not arbitrary but reasonably serve a valid purpose. 
'Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circum-
stances' [citation to Vermont Yankee] ... , the federal regulations must 
be and are upheld."90 Thus, this court used Vermont Yankee to define a 
test for substantive review of rules, and not just for review of the proce-
dures by which those rules had been promulgated.91 
Supp. 950, 964 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("[t]he Court is convinced that the substantial im-
pact test survives the Supreme Court's prohibition of the judicial formulation of 
hybrid rulemaking proceedings in Vermont Yankee .... "); Cerro Metal Prod. v. 
Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869, 879-80 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("But the determination of 
whether a regulation substantially affects the rights of those it regulates does not 
stray beyond the Act, rather it serves to define what is a procedural rule within the 
meaning of the Act."); Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 466 (S.D. Fla. 
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1980). 
86. See McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 498 F. Supp. 194, 
200-04 (D. Wyo. 1979), ajJ'd in part. rev'd in part, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
87. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 562 F. Supp. 
1004, 1007 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (preliminary injunction granted following award of pub-
lishing contract for military post newspaper). 
88. 464 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
89. [d. at 157. 
90. [d. 
91. See Fort Worth & D. Ry. v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 121, 138 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
("Therefore, from the very language of the statute, it is clear that Congress intended 
that the FRA be allowed wide discretion in establishing the actual penalty level. 
This Court is therefore, extremely reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. Vermont Yankee . ... "), rev'd, 693 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982); Holbrook v. 
Pitt, 479 F. Supp. 990, 996 (E.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(rule allowing apparently arbitrary retroactive certification for eligibility for HUD 
benefits not challenged; court cited Vermont Yankee for the proposition that it was 
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Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States 92 involved an action against 
the Tariff Commission to recover dumping duties. The Customs Court 
turned aside assertions that cross-examination was required in the ad-
ministrative proceeding, noting that the applicable statute did not require 
a hearing, and that due process did not necessarily require a trial-type 
hearing with an opportunity for cross-examination. The administrative 
action in this instance was only an informal adjudicatory type fact find-
ing investigation for which neither statute nor Constitution demanded 
cross-examination.93 There is little that is extraordinary in the court's 
conclusion, but it is noteworthy that the court quoted the "absent consti-
tutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances ... " lan-
guage of Vermont Yankee as authority.94 This district court thus went 
beyond applying the Vermont Yankee doctrine to procedural review of 
informal or hybrid rulemaking, beyond application to substantive review 
of rules, and in fact extended application of the Vermont Yankee princi-
ples entirely beyond the context of rules and rulemaking to a new area: to 
procedural review of informal adjudicatory proceedings. 
Other cases invoking Vermont Yankee to justify a limited judicial 
role in review of agency adjudicatory procedures include an action by a 
federal employee to recover health insurance benefits,95 and an action 
against EPA to review its decision to stop further processing of a grant 
application for a sewerage treatment plant.96 
Vermont Yankee has also influenced district courts' perceptions of 
their own equitable powers. For example, in an action to remove a feder-
ally appointed receiver for a state savings and loan, a district court found 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's action in appointing the receiver 
to be in violation of the applicable statute and its underlying policy. The 
court therefore ordered the receiver removed.97 It held that the Board 
had failed to establish the statutory prerequisites for Board jurisdiction, 
but noted that the "power to reexamine the Board's decision [that it had 
"not at liberty to impose [its] own. notions as to how the ... program ought to be 
administered"). 
92. 477 F. Supp. 201 (Cust. Ct. 1979), affd, 634 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
93. Id. at 213. 
94.Id. 
95. Levin v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 385, 386-88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(court notes that since Congress gave the Office of Personnel Management discre-
tion as to performance of its duties, the agency's procedures are "immune from 
attack absent either constitutional constraints or extremely compelling 
circumstances"). 
96. State ex rei. Burch v. Costle, 452 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (D.D.C. 1978) (when an 
agency exercises judgment on a set of facts, the court should defer and not substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency); cf Southwest Jefferson County Homeowners, 
Inc. v. Costle, 468 F. Supp. 405, 407-09 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (court refused to intervene 
in EPA's decision not to require an environmental impact statement as to part of a 
sewer project, "absent a showing of extremely compelling circumstances or any con-
stitutional constraint. . . "). 
97. Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 540 F. Supp. 1374 
(N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983). 
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jurisdiction to appoint a receiver] is not unlimited. On the contrary, the 
normal rule that fundamental policy questions should be resolved by the 
legislative and executive branches and not by the courts applies with 
equal force to the present situation."98 The court cited Vermont Yankee 
for this proposition, thus acknowledging that application of the Vermont 
Yankee doctrine can limit a court's equity jurisdiction.99 
When there is no question of jurisdiction, however, one district 
court has found nothing in Vermont Yankee to inhibit the exercise of its 
power to formulate equitable relief commensurate to the harm. Citing 
Vermont Yankee, among others, it noted that "although the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that a court, in formulating equitable relief, 
should not usurp traditional administrative functions," once jurisdiction 
is established the court may provide such equitable relief as necessary to 
address the harm,lOO Finally, in a case in which a disappointed bidder 
sought an injunction prohibiting award of a publishing contract for an 
army post's newspaper, a district court dismissed arguments against the 
injunction based on Vermont Yankee. The court reasoned that neither 
statute nor regulation required use of informal rulemaking procedures in 
making the contract award, that Vermont Yankee concerned agency 
rulemaking, and that therefore the situation in Vermont Yankee was one 
which "is not comparable to the situation at hand."lOl Thesignificance 
of these cases is not so much that district courts may perceive Vermont 
Yankee to mandate limited use of their equity powers when administra-
tive agencies are involved, but is rather that one finds the courts con-
fronting Vermont Yankee so far afield from judicial imposition of 
additional procedures in informal rulemaking. 102 
98. Id. at 1378; see also Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 572 F. Supp. 997, 1003-04 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Board's exercise of discretion in 
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction to appoint a receiver not entirely beyond 
reach of court's review, because Board accused of "outrageous behavior"; court nev-
ertheless acknowledged that a court is generally to refrain from substituting its judg-
ment for the Board's decision to exercise jurisdiction, once the court is satisfied that 
statutory criteria were met). 
99. Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 540 F. Supp. 1374, 
1378, rev'd, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983). 
100. Doe v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D. Md. 1984). 
101. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 562 F. Supp. 
1004 (S.D. Ga. 1983). 
102. Vermont Yankee has also been considered in a number of class actions challenging 
administrative delay in Social Security benefit hearings. See, e.g., Deloney v. 
Califano, 488 F. Supp. 610, 613 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("The Court also has reservations 
with respect to the proper role of the courts in this type of administrative proceed-
ings. In Vermont Yankee . .. the Supreme Court expressed concern that reviewing 
courts will '(engraft) their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies en-
trusted with substantive functions by Congress.'. . . While evidence of greatly dis-
proportionate delays in agency action or evidence of a lack of evenhandedness or a 
dilatory motive on the part of an agency may in some cases warrant judicial relief, 
here there is no such evidence."); Blankenship v. Secretary, 522 F. Supp. 618, 619-
20 (W.O. Ky. 1981) ("We agree with the defendants that examination of the pro-
posals for 'desirability' would, under the circumstances of this case, violate all prin-
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Vermont Yankee has had an even more curious history in the dis-
trict courts in its relationship to some traditional administrative law doc-
trines. In one case, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to bar release of informa-
tion concerning its products. The CPSC was in the process of promul-
gating disclosure rules, and the District Court for the Northern District 
of New York found that the information could not be disclosed until the 
rulemaking process was complete. It said that it would not pass on the 
rules until they were adopted and cited Vermont Yankee for the proposi-
tion that judicial review on the CPSC's substantive defenses was pre-
cluded for now.to3 The court thus brought Vermont Yankee into the area 
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In another case 
a district court observed that "the method of exercising the delegated 
authority, whether by rulemaking or adjudication, is up to the Secretary 
to determine," and cited only Vermont Yankee. 104 SEC v. Chenery 
Corp.toS (Chenery II) is the case usually cited to support this proposi-
tion. Is Vermont Yankee now to supplant Chenery II? 
The reality is that the district courts have not only followed Ver-
mont Yankee, but arguably have extended it. Cases resisting, much less 
rejecting, its principles are few. Only one appears to depart from it. In 
Hoeber v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,106 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that an area urban renewal 
plan could not be modified without an impact analysis and written con-
sent of affected landowners and lessees. The court noted that the agency 
could adopt rules to establish a method for determining substantial and 
adverse effects on such persons and observed: 
Vermont Yankee . . . is not inconsistent with this procedure. 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that courts may not im-
pose procedural requirements beyond those specified in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act . . . . Here, plaintiffs have not 
requested the imposition of additional procedural requirements, 
but the Court is filling a void left by a statutory provision which 
necessitates procedures to give it meaning and content. to7 
Vermont Yankee, of course, suggests that just this kind of procedural 
void is to be filled by Congress or the agency and not by the jUdiciary. 
ciples of separation of powers. Vermont Yankee. . . . We do not believe that ... 
this Court [has] the authority to reach out to decide issues of purely internal 
administration. "). 
103. Fountainhead Group, Inc. v. CPSC, 527 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), order va-
cated, 559 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. N.Y. 1982). 
104. Matze v. Block, 564 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (D. Kan. 1983), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 
732 F.2d 799, 802-03 (10th Cir. 1984) (the court of appeals was willing to require 
rulemaking rather than adjudication on abuse of discretion grounds). 
105. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (the choice between rulemaking 
and adjudication is primarily a matter for the "informed discretion" of the agency). 
106. 483 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1980), ajJ'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
107. Id. at 1369 n.45. 
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B. Courts of Appeals Other Than the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit 
The pattern in the courts of appeals has been comparable to that in 
the district courts, with only slightly greater evidence of an inclination to 
limit or to depart from the teaching of Vermont Yankee. In light of the 
importance of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
in administrative law generally, and especially in Vermont Yankee, it is 
examined separately in the section that follows. Courts of appeals have 
cited Vermont Yankee in a number of cases in which the courts declined 
to impose additional procedural requirements in rulemaking. 108 
McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energyl09 pre-
sented an interesting and added dimension to the Vermont Yankee prob-
108. See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 
1982) (alleged procedural defects in an informal rulemaking were agency's failure to 
stamp documents with date and failure to include in index certain documents re-
ceived after close of comment period; court refused to declare rule invalid, finding 
no evidence that agency had relied on late documents or that documents were criti-
cal, and that "for this court to impose these requirements would be to disregard the 
Supreme Court's holding" in Vermont Yankee); North Am. Van Lines v. ICC, 666 
F.2d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981) (ICC allegedly failed to give sufficient time for study 
of proposed rule; actually ICC had extended the statutory period for comment from 
30 to 45 days; court found the demand for more without merit and beyond its au-
thority). In another case involving time limits and the ICC, an agency rule provided 
that determinations of market dominance for ratemaking purposes could be made 
within 90 days. Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378 (5th 
Cir. 1982), affd en bane, 719 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2160 
(1984). The court cited Vermont Yankee and found that the agency is the "best 
arbiter of its ability adequately to consider those factors within the time allowed." 
Id. at 392. For other cases in which courts of appeals found Vermont Yankee to 
require judicial restraint from imposition of additional procedural requirements in 
rulemaking, see Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670 (2d Cir. 
1979) (court refused to impose limits on ex parte contacts between agency and an 
"allegedly biased staff in rulemaking," citing Vermont Yankee and noting that the 
alleged contacts did not violate due process and are more appropriately dealt with 
by Congress; rule ultimately held invalid on grounds of violation of the applicable 
statute), reh'g denied, 628 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1980). The dissenting judge on the 
denial of rehearing noted: "I can only hope that the Court which decided Vermont 
Yankee . .. will examine this, in my opinion, unjustifiable intrusion into the admin-
istrative process." Id. at 758. The dissenter believed that the majority, in setting 
aside the FTC's rule on vocational and home study schools, had gone too far in its 
interpretation of the degree of specificity which the statute required in the rule. 
Accord Belenke v. SEC, 606 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1979) (the argument that the 
SEC should have followed a "more exacting procedural formula" in approving 
amendments to exchange rules "violates the Supreme Court's admonition in Ver-
mont Yankee that reviewing courts should be hesitant to impose more procedural 
requirements than found in the authorizing statute or adopted by the administrative 
agency"); Barton v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 1009, 1011 (6th Cir. 1978) (summary judg-
ment affirmed denying injunction to suspend a Department of Agriculture rule; 
court noted that the effect of the requested action would be to amend or suspend the 
rule without normal rulemaking procedures, and it could not do this without impos-
ing its own notions of "correct procedures" in contravention of Vermont Yankee). 
109. 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), affg in part, rev'g in part, 498 F. Supp. 
194 (D. Wyo. 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 86 for a discussion of 
other aspects of the district court's decision. 
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lem. To determine whether the administrative record was complete, the 
district court had permitted depositions of agency officials responsible for 
the rulemaking. The depositions, however, went beyond this purpose, 
and the district court relied on some of the additional information gar-
nered to invalidate the rule. I \0 The court of appeals found that: 
the district court exceeded its authority in its consideration of 
the depositions. In Vermont Yankee . .. the Court noted the 
broad discretion vested in an agency to decide how it may best 
proceed to develop the needed evidence to support its decision 
. . . , and warned that unwarranted judicial examination of 
perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding 
seriously interferes with the process prescribed by Congress. I I I 
The effect of the decision was to treat the district court's use of the depo-
sitions as an impermissible addition of procedure to the rulemaking 
process. 
Challenges to agency rulemaking procedures have been similarly un-
successful in cases involving rules exempt from AP A procedures. 112 The 
prevailing view of Vermont Yankee is that its principles apply whether or 
not a rule is exempt from notice and comment under the AP A. \13 The 
issue is typically presented in a case in which a rule is considered inter-
pretative and thus exempt, but the court nevertheless is asked to require 
notice and comment. I 14 The general theory supporting imposition of no-
110. McCulloch Gas Processing Corp., 650 F.2d at 1229. 
111. Id. 
112. E.g., American Transfer & Storage Co. v. ICC, 719 F.2d 1283, 1303-06 (5th Cir. 
1983) ("This case presents just the sort of 'subordinate questions of procedure'. . . 
which ought to be left to the informed discretion of the Commissioner"; thus, the 
court did not exercise the independent judgment it might have in addressing allega-
tions of procedural irregularity, including material change between proposed and 
final rule). Furthermore, the courts will and should make an independent determi-
nation of whether the rule is exempt or not. If it is not exempt, requiring notice-
and-comment procedures to satisfy the terms of the AP A is entirely consistent with 
Vermont Yankee. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 
804-05 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Standard 
Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1061-62 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1978) (court noted that in determining that the rule was interpretative it was not 
imposing additional procedures; its concern was "compliance with minimum statu-
tory requirements"). 
113. Love v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 704 F.2d 100, 105 n.17 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
114. The issue also has been presented in cases involving the question of whether 
rulemaking was exempt from notice and comment under the "good cause" excep-
tion in section 553(b) of the APA. Thus, the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals has refused to "impose a new procedural requirement . . . contrary to 
Vermont Yankee" when it was satisfied that the notice of "good cause" did provide 
an adequate explanation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 
1493 n.21 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3545 (1984). On 
the other hand, the court indicated it was not imposing additional procedures con-
trary to Vermont Yankee when it concluded in another case that the "good cause" 
exception was not available and therefore that notice and comment were required. 
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tice and comment in such cases is that a common law of fairness de-
mands this result when the interpretative rule has a "substantial impact" 
on a segment of the public. I IS 
The general reaction in the courts of appeals has been that this posi-
tion is untenable in light of Vermont Yankee 1l6 because the decision 
"cast considerable doubt on the viability of those €ases holding that the 
notice and comment procedure may be judicially required even when not 
required by the terms of the APA."117 A number have been fully cogni-
zant of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's view that Vermont Yankee 
should be interpreted narrowly and does not preclude judicial develop-
ment of administrative common law in such cases. I IS This is noteworthy 
in light of the frequency with which the federal courts follow his lead. 
The courts of appeals also have recognized the possible exceptions 
to Vermont Yankee. Most of the cases in which the exceptions have been 
raised, however, have involved proceedings other than informal rulemak-
ing. Love v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Develop-
ment1l9 illustrates the exceptions in the context of rulemaking. The 
district court had ordered notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement 
tenant comment procedures for identifying unreasonable lease provi-
sions. The district court's order was quite specific concerning how HUD 
was to handle tenant comments. 120 HUD argued that under Vermont 
Yankee the district court's order constituted "an unwarranted intrusion 
on the Agency's prerogative" and was not a legitimate exercise of the 
court's equitable powers or required under due process. 121 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980). In another case the EPA argued that 
statutory deadlines in developing federal air quality standards justified a "blanket 
exemption" from notice and comment under the "good cause" standard; it pointed 
to Vermont Yankee in support of this position. The court concluded that "[s]uch an 
interpretation of 'good cause' would amount to judicial legislation." Western Oil & 
Gas Ass'n v. United States Envt\. Protection Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 810-12 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
115. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1982). 
116. See Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., 
International Union v. Donovan, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984); American Trucking 
Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1982) (dictum), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 
1205, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1982) (dictum); Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 
984, 986-88 (9th Cir. 1980); Energy Consumers and Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. De-
partment of Energy, 632 F.2d 129, 139-41 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 832 (1980); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 
1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). 
117. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., In-
ternational Union v. Donovan, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984). 
118. Id.; Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 1980); cf Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1096 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App. 1978) (judicial development of administrative common law is feasible only 
in rare instances). 
119. 704 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1983). 
120. Id. at 103. 
121. Id. The court of appeals did not reach the issue of mandatory rulemaking presented 
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that informal 
rulemaking was the appropriate mechanism for identifying unreasonable 
lease provisions and that judicial imposition of other means of doing so 
carried with it the risk of exactly what Vermont Yankee feared - "a 
hovering judicial spectre [that] would scare agencies into adopting full 
adjudicatory procedures .... "122 It rejected the argument that the 
constitutional constraint exception justified more, reasoning that the 
Constitution "does not require the resolution of facts on a case-by-case 
basis" to determine unreasonable lease provisions, and that there was no 
showing of compelling circumstances. 123 
Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have also considered applica-
tion of the Vermont Yankee exceptions in the rulemaking context. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had little difficulty in disposing 
of a claim, based upon due process, for additional procedures in rulemak-
ing: "The allegation that there is a constitutional right to notice and an 
opportunity to comment when an agency makes rules of general applica-
bility is frivolous. It presents no substantial constitutional claim."124 
Likewise, in a rulemaking case involving a request for more time to com-
ment than required by the applicable statute, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit found no compelling circumstances justifying depar-
ture from the rule of Vermont Yankee. 125 
Yet, as noted, the more extensive discussion of the exceptions is 
found in cases in which informal rulemaking procedure was not at issue. 
For example, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,126 the First Cir-
cuit reviewed the adjudicatory procedures employed by the EPA 127 in 
approving a nuclear plant's cooling system. The EPA Administrator had 
ordered his staff not to appear as proponents of any particular result and 
to avoid adversarial positions, and the petitioners argued that this "novel 
order" was improper.128 The court noted that agencies have "wide lati-
tude in fashioning their procedural rules."129 It also observed that 
although Vermont Yankee recognizes a possible exception for unjustified 
departures from well settled and longstanding agency practice, and even 
assuming the "novel order" was such an unjustified departure, that ex-
ception is limited "to where the agency deprived some party other than 
by the case. By the time the case reached the court, HUD had completed its 
rulemaking and did not appeal the issue. [d. at 102-03. 
122. [d. at 103. 
123. [d. at 105. 
124. Starnes v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 134, 141 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, Heckler v. 
Starnes, 104 S. Ct. 2673 (1984). 
125. North Am. Van Lines v. ICC, 666 F.2d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981). 
126. 597 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1979). 
127. The EPA's order affirmed a prior order that had been invalidated by the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, which had remanded the issue to the EPA for rehear-
ing. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 824 (1978). 
128. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1979). 
129. [d. at 308. 
280 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
itself of important procedural rights normally accorded."130 This case 
was not of that nature. 13l 
In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 132 the Sec-
ond Circuit overruled a district court l33 that had appointed a special 
master to oversee agency compliance with the district court's order set-
ting forth certain procedural requirements for preparing Environmental 
Impact Statements. 134 The court of appeals vacated that portion of the 
judgment relating to the special master; in doing so it relied extensively 
on Vermont Yankee and stated that "except in most extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the courts may not control the internal operations of federal 
administrative agencies .... "135 It was not willing to conclude that the 
case involved "extremely compelling circumstances"; assurance of timely 
compliance and reducing the risk of later litigation were not enough to 
justify appointment of the special master. 136 
Application of the Vermont Yankee exceptions has also been raised 
and rejected in a case involving a state's request that the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission institute a proceeding and hold a hearing concerning 
nuclear licensing,137 the Interstate Commerce Commission's denial of a 
petition to reopen a railroad abandonment proceeding,138 and enforce-
ment of a National Labor Relations Board bargaining order which was 
developed through investigation rather than full adversarial 
procedures. 139 
130. Id. at 308 n.l. 
131. See also Season-All Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1981). In this 
case the court ordered an evidentiary hearing to investigate irregularities in connec-
tion with a representation election. The dissent believed the majority had required a 
hearing when the "factual predicate" for a hearing was lacking, that the result was 
"a court crafted rule" requiring a hearing on the basis of vague and unsupported 
allegations, and that this contravened the principle of Vermont Yankee that proce-
dural matters are to be left to the agency. Id. at 942-43 (Adams, J., dissenting). 
The majority responded that its direction of an evidentiary hearing did not "in any 
way implicate Vermont Yankee . . . " because all it was doing was requiring the 
agency to follow its own policy to hold hearings when there is a dispute as to sub-
stantial and material issues of fact. Id. at 940-41 n.5. 
Perhaps neither intending to nor aware that it had done so, the court appar-
ently applied the "unjustified departure" exception to the Vermont Yankee rule -
but in the context of an adjudication rather than a rulemaking. 
132. 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983). 
133. 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
134. 701 F.2d 1011, 1042-43, 1043 n.30 (2d Cir. 1983). 
135. Id. at 1042. The Court considered the action of the court of appeals in Vermont 
Yankee "far less intrusive than ... here, where the special master apparently was 
to control every detail of every step of the agencies' reconsiderations." Id. at 1043. 
136. Id. at 1043. The court also found there was insufficient evidence to present "a clear 
and convincing picture of such pervasive bad faith as to suggest that absent judicial 
supervision, the agency probably will not obey an injunction detailing its obliga-
tions." Id. at 1048. 
137. People v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 591 F.2d 12, 15-16 (9th Cir. 1979). 
138. City of Wausau v. United States, 703 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1983). 
139. NLRB v: ARA Sers., Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 69 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., concurring). 
The dissent suggested that to require a hearing in this case was to require no more 
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There is at least one court of appeals case that does appear to have 
relied on the exceptions to impose additional procedures outside of the 
informal rulemaking context. The Interstate Commerce Commission 
had approved an application for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to abandon a railroad line. l40 The Commission had denied an 
opportunity for cross-examination on supplementary evidence received 
by the agency. Upon review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit viewed the case as an informal adjudication 141 and concluded that 
cross-examination should have been allowed: It noted: 
We begin with a reluctance to interfere with an agency's free-
dom to fashion its own rules of procedure. See Vermont Yankee 
. . . . But although requests for cross-examination are ad-
dressed to the discretion of an agency, that discretion is not 
unlimited. A court may determine that 'extremely compelling 
circumstances,' Vermont Yankee . .. exist to indicate that an 
agency's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. The ques-
tion before us, then, is whether the facts here rise to such ex-
tremely compelling circumstances that the ICC should have 
afforded the parties the opportunity for cross-examination. 142 
It explained: 
We emphasize the narrowness of our conclusion. . . . We do 
not hold that the ICC must afford cross-examination in all 
cases where supplemental evidence is taken after proceedings in 
which cross-examination was allowed. Rather, our conclusion 
is based on the combination of factors in this case: cross-exami-
nation was initially allowed; it played a key role in the determi-
nation of facts in the initial hearing; the agency then received 
supplemental evidence of the same type as that provided, and 
discredited after cross-examination, in the initial hearing; and 
the agency's final decision ignored the many serious factual dis-
putes and gave no indication that the agency could have re-
solved those disputes on the basis of the written supplementary 
evidence submitted. 143 
The intriguing feature of the case is that it was unnecessary for the court 
to tum to Vermont Yankee. It had recognized the adjudicatory nature of 
the proceeding and noted that "while there is no across-the-board right 
to oral argument in every administrative proceeding, . . . the general 
principle is that the right to be heard in adjudicative proceedings encom-
passes due process rights in excess of the right to submit written evi-
than the Board's own rules, and consequently there was no conflict with Vermont 
Yankee. [d. at 74 n.8 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
140. People v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981). 
141. [d. at 1071-72. 
142. [d. at 1082. 
143. [d. at 1083. 
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dence."I44 Traditional notions 
adjudication would therefore 
examination. 145 
of due process m administrative 
have sufficed to require cross-
The general principles of Vermont Yankee have had their impact in 
the courts of appeals in contexts other than the procedures applicable in 
informal rulemaking. 146 The general position is that when Congress es-
144. Id. at 1082. 
145. Cf Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. United States, 585 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1978). 
In this case, a railroad petitioned for review of an Interstate Commerce Commission 
dismissal of its application to be included in a railroad merger. The court concluded 
that dismissal of the application was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discre-
tion by reason of inadequate notice of oral arguments on the merits of the railroad's 
application. Id. at 259-60. The ICC argued that the APA's notice requirements 
were inapplicable because this proceeding was neither rulemaking nor formal adju-
dication, and the court agreed. Id. at 260. The court said, however, that analysis 
could not end at that: "Fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings requires 
notice clearly informing a party of the proposed action and basis for that action." 
Id. The court considered notice particularly important and its absence here "partic-
ularly unfair" in light of the "substantial economic detriment" possible. Id. at 262. 
The court also agreed that there was no statutory duty to hold a hearing or make 
findings, but that nevertheless "some type of fair proceeding" was in order. Id. at 
262-63. 
As to the nature of that "fair proceeding," the court made clear that the agency 
could not employ summary procedures without an opportunity to be heard on the 
merits. Id. The court further noted that courts may impose additional procedures 
for reasons of fairness to ensure "principled decision-making," but that the exact 
formulation of those procedures must be left to the agency, as Vermont Yankee 
requires. Id. at 263 n.15. 
Id. 
Thus we do not prescribe the exact nature of the notice requirement nor 
do we prescribe the procedure by which the ICC should provide the Mil-
waukee with an opportunity to be heard. We do leave these procedural 
matters to the discretion of the ICC, but nevertheless require that there be 
an appropriate exercise of that discretion. 
The court thus required more procedural opportunities than any applicable 
statute demanded or the agency desired, but without great specificity as to just what 
was required. 
146. See, e.g., Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(court reluctant to require new hearing rather than reinstatement when the evidence 
upon which an employee discharge was based violated due process); New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 659 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 
1981) (court denied request for a "second duplicative evidentiary hearing" in a Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission approval of contested natural gas rate-filing 
settlements); Zachary v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 621 F.2d 155, 158-59 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980) (court denied requests that thejudici-
ary impose an evidentiary hearing or oral argument in a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission proceeding when there were no disputed facts); Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759, 773 (3d Cir. 
1979) (court denied request that the judiciary impose an adjudicatory hearing on a 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission declaration of a moratorium on licensing decisions 
and rulemaking concerning recycling of spent fuels); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 
581 F.2d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (court reluc-
tant to require extensions when statutory EPA deadlines for water pollution permits 
had not been met); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166, 167-75 (2d Cir. 1978) (court would not 
interfere in agency denial of petition for rulemaking on permanent disposal of spent 
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tablishes procedures for administrative action, whether by informal 
rulemaking, formal rulemaking, or by adjuciation, and the agency does 
not elect to afford more, "the courts may not override the determination 
simply because they believe other procedures would be preferable."147 
Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB148 illustrates a typical 
application of the Vermont Yankee doctrine in the context of adjudica-
tion. The case was a rehearing to reconsider the court's pre-Vermont 
Yankee decision in which it had found that the NLRB must provide an 
independent statement of basis for its bargaining order, and not simply 
wastes when agency preferred to address the issue in individual licensing proceed-
ings); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir. 1978) (court 
reluctant to impose procedural requirements in government procurement). In each 
of these cases Vermont Yankee was cited in justifying reluctance to interfere with 
the agencies' inclinations. 
The courts of appeals also have considered the matter of administrative delay 
in social security benefit proceedings. Some of them have invoked Vermont Yankee 
in refusing to impose mandatory time limits on the adjudication of these claims. In 
Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 351-56 (7th Cir. 1978), the court found that the 
delays were not so unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention when, as in this 
case, due process was not denied. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Ver-
mont Yankee had cautioned against courts "engrafting" their own notions of proper 
procedure. [d. at 352. The court in Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 
1982), vacated on other grounds, Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984), was simi-
larly inclined. It felt Congress had the ultimate responsibility for correcting 
problems in the administration of federal programs, although it also believed there 
was a role for the court when the applicable statute was not being followed. [d. at 
22. See supra note 102 for a discussion of the district court cases. 
147. Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1978) (the applicable 
statutes required a hearing only when the agency sought termination of funds, and 
the court would not require a hearing and public participation before the agency 
could enter a memorandum of understanding allowing the school board to assign 
teachers on the basis of race). 
The Interstate Commerce Commission in particular has been the object of 
claims for judicially imposed procedures, which the courts of appeals generally have 
rejected. See, e.g., People v. ICC, 698 F.2d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 1983) (court turned 
aside requests for more intrusive administrative appellate review in a railroad aban-
donment proceeding); Simmons v. United States, 698 F.2d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(court refused to intervene in the agency's decisions refusing an extension of time to 
respond to new evidence, a postponement of the hearing because counsel had a 
court conflict, and requiring that the administrative law judge hear "oral opposition 
testimony upon remand"; court considered its role "narrow" in reviewing proce-
dural issues, citing Vermont Yankee); People v. ICC, 687 F.2d 1047, 1057 (7th Cir. 
1982) (court turned aside request for a public hearing on a decision to allow one 
railroad to acquire another); Laird v. ICC, 691 F.2d 147, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(court turned aside request for an oral hearing and discovery on a petition to set 
aside commission approval of a regulated carrier's reverse stock split), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 460-61 
(5th Cir. 1981) (review of ICC rules for informal adjudication in which the court 
refused to impose more than the notice and comment afforded), cert. denied, 103 S. 
Ct. 1272 (1983); Akron, C. & Y. R.R. v. United States, 586 F.2d 29, 32 (7th Cir. 
1978) (court turned aside request for more than abbreviated notice to announce 
nonconcurrence in not yet effective joint rates); Crete Carrier Corp. v. United 
States, 577 F.2d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1978) (court turned aside request for an oral hear-
ing and cross-examination on a petition to set aside a grant of operating authority). 
148. 580 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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incorporate by reference the findings of the administrative law judge. 149 
Here, the court reversed its earlier position. 
[Although Vermont Yankee] dealt with a factual and adminis-
trative context different from that here and, in particular, in-
volved the review of rule-making, rather than adjudicatory 
procedures, it expresses the basic philosophy that agencies 
should be relatively free to establish their own procedures and 
mechanisms for decision-making on subjects within the scope 
of their expertise. ISO 
As a result, the "spirit of Vermont Yankee must be given attention," and 
a separate statement of reasons would not be required. ISI 
There is greater evidence in the courts of appeals than in the district 
courts of a willingness to give Vermont Yankee less controlling weight. 
Virtually none of those cases has involved informal rulemaking, however, 
and in those cases that do involve judicial review of informal rulemaking, 
most of the courts choosing not to follow Vermont Yankee have tended 
to distinguish the case rather than disparage or reject it. The distinction 
drawn by these latter courts is one between judicial imposition of proce-
dures in excess of those required for informal rulemaking by § 553 of the 
APA, clearly forbidden by Vermont Yankee, and a judicial requirement 
149. Id. at 62. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. For cases in which other courts of appeals follow the Third Circuit's lead in 
Kenworth Trucks, see NLRB v. Windsor Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 860, 866 (2d Cir. 
1984) (court saw "no reason to take a different view"); Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 
F.2d 765, 772, & n.ll (5th Cir. 1978) (NLRB had refused to reopen a case for the 
taking of evidence concerning employee turnover during the time between the ad-
ministrative law judge's decision and the Board's review of that decision; reviewing 
court was reluctant to impose a requirement that would "seriously interfere with 
[the Board's] established procedures, noting that Vermont Yankee is a "reaffirma-
tion of the general principle that courts of appeal should not interfere with agency 
procedure." The court did observe that there may be situations where the Board 
might be required to reopen "to proceed fairly," but that there was insufficient evi-
dence to do so here); see also Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 
1981) (Vermont Yankee joins Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 
(1951), as authority for the proposition that the scope of judicial review over bar-
gaining orders is confined to a determination of whether the relevant factors have 
been considered, with the weight to be given the factors left to the agency even if the 
court disagrees); NLRB v. Living and Learning Centers, Inc., 652 F.2d 209, 214 
(1st Cir. 1981) (same as Big Y Foods). All ofthese cases are concerned with judicial 
review of NLRB adjudicatory procedures. Vermont Yankee thus seems established 
as a factor in review of this agency's procedures. 
Courts of appeals also have cited Vermont Yankee for the proposition that the 
jUdiciary is not to interfere once it is determined that the statutory criteria have been 
met for appointment of receivers for ailing financial institutions. Biscayne Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1983) (citing Telegraph Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 
564 F. Supp. 862, 875-76 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd sub nom. Telegraph Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983» (the 
wisdom of the exercise of the power to appoint a receiver is not subject to reexami-
nation under the guise of judicial review), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2656 (1984). 
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that the agency's record, produced by procedures chosen by the agency, 
when judicially reviewed under the appropriate standard,152 rationally 
support the rule. Thus, these courts seem to say that, notwithstanding 
Vermont Yankee's mandate that choice of procedure to develop the nec-
essary record must be left to the agency, the courts retain a right of sub-
stantive review to determine whether the necessary record has been 
developed. If the procedures chosen by the agency fail to produce the 
necessary record, that is to provide rational support for the adoption of a 
rule, the court may invalidate the rule and remand to the agency for 
development of an acceptable record. The agency may then choose to 
repeat the same procedures that it originally chose to use and hope that 
the reviewing court will now find the record adequately supports the 
agency decision, or the agency may choose to use more extensive proce-
dures than the minimum required by § 553 of the APA, thus producing a 
more extensive record, and perhaps then satisfying a reviewing court. 
In National Crushed Stone Association, Inc. v. EPA,153 for example, 
the Fourth Circuit reviewed EPA rules concerning the discharge of pol-
lutants by point sources of crushed stone, sand, and gravel. The court 
held the rule's suspended solids limits invalid and remanded for reconsid-
eration. The court indicated that under Vermont Yankee the agency was 
free to fashion its own procedures and that the APA imposed maximum 
mandatory procedures,154 but noted that "courts are no longer satisfied 
with bare administrative ipse dixits, and the Agency must make reasoned 
decisions with full articulation of the reasoning and take into account all 
relevant factors."155 
The rule was remanded, however, both because the agency failed to 
give its reasoning and because the agency failed to provide an opportu-
nity for interested persons to respond to certain data upon which the 
agency relied. 156 The first reason for remand hardly represents a rebel-
lion against the principles of Vermont Yankee in rulemaking. Had the 
court stopped there, its holding would have been consistent with Ver-
mont Yankee. In requiring that the agency provide an opportunity for 
interested persons to respond to data upon which the agency relied, how-
ever, the court overstepped the boundary set by Vermont Yankee, effec-
tively imposing procedures upon an agency. 
In National Industrial Sand Association v. Marshall,157 the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit utilized reasoning similar to that used by 
the Fourth Circuit in National Crushed Stone. The court reviewed the 
152. The appropriate standard for judicial review of informal rulemaking is whether the 
record provides rational support for the agency decision, that is, that the decision 
was not arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
153. 601 F.2d III (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). 
154. [d. at 116. 
155. /d. 
156. [d. at 118. 
157. 601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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Secretary of Labor's training rules for mining companies and in its dis-
cussion of the scope of its review stated: 
We must also be mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court 
in Vermont Yankee. . . . The principal thrust of that decision 
was to discourage the courts of appeals from engrafting proce-
dural requirements on the rulemaking standards established 
under. . . the APA, 5 U.S.c. sec. 553. Beyond this, the Court 
did not specifically condemn the "hard look" doctrine. 15s 
Yet the court eventually upheld the rules. As did the Fourth Circuit in 
National Crushed Stone, all the Third Circuit seems to have been indicat-
ing is that the primary thrust of Vermont Yankee is to control judicial 
imposition of additional procedures and not the ability of the courts to 
examine with care what the agency has done. 
Some cases involving judicial review of administrative action other 
than informal rulemaking have dealt with Vermont Yankee in similar 
fashion. In East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States,159 a 
case involving review of an Interstate Commerce Commission order 
granting a carrier temporary authority to carry commodities, the ICC 
argued that it was not required to provide full findings and explanation of 
its decision and the court could not impose such in light of Vermont 
Yankee. l60 The court found that the agency still should "explain its re-
sults," that this would pose "no intolerable burden," and that: 
We do not think that Vermont Yankee prevents this court from 
remanding for an administrative explanation in an appropriate 
case. The Court did not purport to address the principle that in 
order to preserve effective review, a court should demand a rea-
soned decision from an administrative agency. Unlike Vermont 
Yankee, the concern in this case is not with the adequacy of 
administrative fact-finding but the effectiveness of judicial re-
view. Also, the judicial intrusion in this case would be mini-
mal: a remand would not require the ICC to reconsider the 
decision it has made, but only articulate some reasons. 161 
The court concluded that although the ICC's failure fully to articulate its 
reasons for granting authority made review difficult, the court was never-
theless able to effectively employ the applicable scope of review,162 and 
affirmed. 163 
158. [d. at 699 n.35. 
159. 593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979). 
160. [d. at 695. 
161. [d. at 695 n.7 (dictum). 
162. [d. at 698 (the "case [was] not an example of the administrative process at its 
best."). 
163. [d.; see also Saylor v. USDA, 723 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1983). In this appeal from an 
adjudicatory proceeding in which the USDA suspended a registrant under the Pack-
ers and Stockyards Act, the court remanded for "lack of a clear statement of rea-
sons" and commented, "we recognize that we may not impose procedural 
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NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp.l64 involved a petition by the 
NLRB for enforcement of its bargaining order. 165 The Third Circuit or-
dered enforcement, but one concurring judge, nonetheless, felt that the 
majority erred in "its wrongful assumption of authority to promulgate an 
essentially procedural rule" in requiring a statement of reasons in sup-
port of the bargaining order and that this ignored "the Supreme Court's 
admonitions" in Vermont Yankee. 166 Other judges, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, defended the majority's requirement of a state-
ment of reasons, noting: 
Requiring the Board to articulate its reasons for imposing a 
bargaining order does not represent an unwarranted judicial in-
terference with administrative procedure. . . . This basic re-
quirement which focuses on effective judicial review cannot be 
deemed to constitute an undue burden on the Board, and does 
not intrude upon internal Board procedures in a manner pro-
scribed by the principle expressed in Vermont Yankee. 167 
requirements in excess of those demanded by the APA. Vermont Yankee. 
However, the Supreme Court recently made clear that Vermont Yankee was not 
meant to abrogate the responsibility of agencies to 'cogently explain' their decisions. 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869-71, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983)." [d. at 584; 
accord Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (use of injunctive 
relief to control methods of determining social security benefits "does not raise is-
sues of judicial interference in administrative agencies' discretion to formulate their 
own procedures" because here the question is one of the "executive branch defying 
the courts"); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 784-86 (11th Cir. 
1983) ("The applicable procedure established by the Corps within the meaning of 
Vermont Yankee is one of contemporaneous application for aU required permits"; 
therefore, the court was not interfering with established procedures or imposing 
additional ones); Artukovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 693 F.2d 894, 
897-99 (9th Cir. 1982) (reopening rather than reconsideration was required under 
due process to afford hearing in revocation of stay of deportation, notwithstanding 
deference to the agency's procedural rules under Vermont Yankee). 
164. 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982). But see Kenworth 
Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 62-63 (3d Cir. 1978) (court 
indicated that although Vermont Yankee "dealt with a factual and administrative 
context different from that here and, in particular, involved the review of rule-mak-
ing rather than adjudicatory procedures ... ," the court nevertheless felt con-
strained by the "spirit of Vermont Yankee" to impose a separate statement of 
reasons requirement in bargaining order proceedings). 
165. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d at 512. 
166. [d. at 522-24. 
167. [d. at 532 (Garth, Hunter, Weiss, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see 
also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (court concluded that the 
administrative law judge, in denying an application for concurrent social security 
benefits, must indicate the evidence rejected as well as make findings upon the evi-
dence received. The dissent believed that Congress should provide the standard, 
and, invoking Vermont Yankee, stated: "I do not agree with the majority's attempt 
to 'engraft [its] own notions of proper procedure upon [this agency which is] en-
trusted with substantive functions by Congress.''' [d. at 708 (Garth, J., dissenting in 
part». In a subsequent bargaining order case, Judge Garth dissented again, noting 
that "Judge Adams [sic] reliance on Vermont Yankee to support his and the major-
ity's position that the Board should not be required to do more than it did here is a 
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Yet, in each of these cases it cannot be said that Vermont Yankee 
was brushed aside. Perhaps the most significant aspect of East Texas 
Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States168 and NLRB v. Permanent 
Label Corp. 169 is that neither involved judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing. The judicial review in these cases was of adjudications. Vermont 
Yankee, on its facts, involves judicial review only of rulemaking, not of 
adjudication. 170 The East Texas Motor Freight Lines and Permanent La-
bel courts therefore might have found Vermont Yankee inapplicable to 
judicial review of adjudication, and hence felt free to impose procedures 
upon agencies for their adjudications. Yet, they did not do so, but indeed 
were careful to avoid judicial imposition of procedure upon agency adju-
dications. These courts thus implicitly held that the Vermont Yankee rule 
applies, not only to judicial review of rulemaking, but also to judicial 
review of adjudication. Thus, these cases, like the rulemaking cases of 
National Crushed Stone Association, Inc. v. EPA 171 and National Indus-
trial Sand Association v. Marshall172 drew a distinction between the for-
bidden judicial imposition of procedures upon an agency, and the courts' 
right, upon review of an agency decision, to demand an adequate record 
that rationally supports the agency decision. These cases, therefore, can-
not be said to represent resistance to Vermont Yankee, and are examples 
of the much more common phenomenon, that of citing Vermont Yankee 
where it is probably neither required nor necessary. 173 Thus, the picture 
misapplication of the principles prescribed by the Supreme Court in that case. In 
Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court held that reviewing courts could not compel 
administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking to adopt procedures prescribed by a 
court in addition to those provided in the Administrative Procedure Act. In the 
instant action, the issue is whether this court should require the Board to provide us 
with a sufficient explanation and articulation for its choice of remedy - i.e., a bar-
gaining order - in h dispute resolved through adjudication." NLRB v. Eastern 
Steel Co., 671 F.2d 104, 115 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, I., dissenting). 
168. 593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979). 
169. 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982). 
170. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text. 
171. 601 F.2d III (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). 
172. 601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979). 
173. For another example of a court of appeals citing Vermont Yankee when it is unnec-
essary, see Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978). In Caswell, the court 
agreed with a district court order requiring that social security disability hearings be 
held within 90 days of a request. Although the court conceded that the agency has 
discretion in setting hearings, that the applicable statutes did not define what is a 
reasonable time, that Congress had not said that the delays at issue were unreasona-
ble, and that Congress "must bear the ultimate responsibility for remedying 
problems in the administration of federal programs ... under Vermont Yankee," it 
said that the jUdiciary still has a role that includes devising appropriate remedies. 
Thus, it was willing to support judicial imposition of time limits on these agency 
proceedings. [d. at 15-17. See also Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 
1982), vacated, Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984); cf Mental Health Ass'n v. 
Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 1983) (The court was "well aware that in 
formulating equitable relief the courts must proceed gingerly and not encroach on 
traditional administrative practices," but courts may fashion "relief commensurate 
to the harm. "). 
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in the courts of appeals other than the D.C. Circuit is similar to that in 
the district courts. 
C. "The D. C. Circuit" 
One of the early commentaries on Vermont Yankee was written by 
Judge Anton Scalia, now of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 174 His article was sharply critical of his future colleagues 
on that court which, he observed, "had been, to put it mildly, a remarka-
bly ineffective instrument for implementing the underlying principles of 
interpretation which the [pre-Vermont Yankee] Supreme Court opinions 
[in administrative law] quite clearly expressed."17s He believed "the 
[Supreme] Court felt, as an institution, that its authority had been 
flouted," and that Vermont Yankee was intended to deal with the 
problem. 176 
Judge Scalia examined the early evidence of the D.C. Circuit's re-
sponse and reaction to Vermont Yankee, and concluded at the time that 
it "flouts the Supreme Court's guidance .... "177 He commented: "A 
tongue-lashing having failed, it will be interesting to see what further 
steps the Supreme Court may take to bring the D.C. Circuit into line."178 
Examination of post-Vermont Yankee decisions of the Supreme 
Court, as indicated previously, discloses that it has done little more than 
confirm the general principles of the opinion. 179 There is no indication 
that the Court has taken particular offense at what has transpired in the 
lower federal judiciary in general, or in the D.C. Circuit in particular. 
The explanation for this may be that later treatment of Vermont Yankee 
by the D.C. Circuit reveals patterns of neither wanton disregard nor 
cheerful obedience. In that regard the judicial record in the D.C. Circuit 
is mixed, yet it is qualitatively distinct from that in the district courts and 
the other courts of appeals. 
The D.C. Circuit reacted to Vermont Yankee and its implications in 
a variety of ways. It has followed it, distinguished it, debated it, and, on 
occasion, undermined it. For example, in remanding a rate-making or-
174. Scalia, supra note 38. 
175. [d. at 363. 
176. [d. at 370-71; see Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471, 482 (1980) 
(reviewing K.C. DAVIS, 1 & 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978, 
1979) (Judge Friendly described Vermont Yankee as the "Supreme Court's resent-
ment of the hubris of the District of Columbia Circuit's imposing procedural re-
quirements on informal rulemaking beyond those specified in the APA"); Note, 
Administrative Law - Vermont Yankee "Maximum Procedural Requirements" Rule, 
27 U. KAN. L. REV. 500, 508 (1979) (Vermont Yankee in its "narrowest sense" was 
a "letter to Judge Bazelon" of the D.C. Circuit, "as an unequivocal rejection of the 
role he envisioned for the courts"). 
177. Scalia, supra note 38, at 396-99. Judge Scalia focused on the decision in United 
States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See 
infra text accompanying notes 301-10 for a discussion of this case. 
178. Scalia, supra note 38, at 400. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 41-55. 
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der to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for failure to apply 
the proper legal criteria, Judge Leventhal offered a number of suggestions 
as to how the agency might exercise its discretion in selecting alternative 
procedures,180 and emphasized: 
that while the court has identified a number of factors for con-
sideration by the Commission, it is aware that the appraisal and 
weighing of these factors is the function of the agency and not 
the court. It is not an encroachment on the agency's ultimate 
discretion either that the court has identified a number of fac-
tors for consideration or . . . a particular emphasis should be 
given a certain factor. 181 
In another opinion reviewing a challenge to a Federal Maritime 
Commission order after remand, in part because of the agency's refusal 
to consider events subsequent to its initial order, Judge Wright observed: 
We emphasize that our earlier opinion expressly stated that the 
Commission had no duty to provide full "evidentiary" hear-
ings. We have no wish to straightjacket the agency with proce-
dural requirements unrelated to its responsibilities. Still, the 
Commission must perform its duties with a full understanding 
of the economic and commercial situation. We cannot find that 
the Order on Remand, reached without consideration of then-
current industry conditions or agency policy, was based on a 
review of relevant factors. 182 
In both cases the court reviewed agency action with an eye to Vermont 
Yankee, but without abdicating all judicial responsibilities. 
The course of Vermont Yankee upon remand is perhaps the best 
example of the possibility of continuing confrontation between the D.C. 
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority, 
stated that Vermont Yankee "held that if an agency complies with the 
procedures required by statute, a rule may be struck down because of 
procedural shortcomings only in unusual circumstances. The Supreme 
Court agreed, however, that the Rule should be vacated if it lacks sup-
port in the administrative record .... "183 He said that the court's duty 
was only to review the rules "on their faces - not the procedures that 
produced them" and that he was not jUdging whether nuclear power was 
good or bad. 184 The court nevertheless found the rules invalid for failure 
180. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094, 
1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). 
181. Id. at 1121. 
182. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 598 F.2d 289, 295 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
183. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). 
184. Id. at 475 n.75. 
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to consider certain matters, including health and socioeconomic issues, 
as well as the cumulative effects of fuel cycle activity.18s 
The appearance is one of consistency with Vermont Yankee; that 
the judge received the Supreme Court's "letter to Judge Bazelon."186 
Judge Wilkey dissented. He commented that Judge Bazelon adopted, for 
the majority, the "too hard a look" doctrine and "if there was ever a 
doubt prior to today, it is now clear this court is committed to an as-
sumed role as high public protector of all that is good from perceived 
evils of nuclear power."187 He felt that Judge Bazelon was looking to 
assess procedural compliance and in the process dictated "just how this 
consideration is best made."188 He concluded that the court "has taken 
no more than a great step sideways from an analysis rejected unani-
mously by the Supreme Court" in Vermont Yankee and [has] "effectively 
taken over control of the nuclear industry."189 
Perhaps the conflict between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Cir-
cuit concerning the proper role of the judiciary in the review of adminis-
trative action continues. The more complete judicial record merits 
examination. 
In a case in which the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA rules on the issu-
ance of orders for primary nonferrous smelters it was asked to order 
cross-examination of an economist. It declined on the basis of Vermont 
Yankee and stated that the "Supreme Court has made clear . . . that 
courts must be particularly reticent about going beyond the procedures 
established by Congress and in requiring agencies to provide additional 
rulemaking procedures." 190 
Several other decisions of the D.C. Circuit reveal similar acceptance 
of the case without evidence of overt resistance. One issue in a challenge 
to the Civil Aeronautics Board's rules on domestic air cargo transport 
was whether the Board had allowed adequate time for oral argument. 
The court had no difficulty concluding that, in light of Vermont Yankee, 
"there is no basis for requiring the Board to go beyond the requirements 
of the APA."191 
In another case involving the EPA's standards for lead in ambient 
185. Id. at 494. 
186. Note, supra note 177, at 508. 
187. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459,517 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 
(1983). 
188. /d. at 537. 
189. Id. at 545; see also Public Sys. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 
973,984 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robb, J., dissenting) ("The thesis of the majority is un-
tenable in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee . ... "). 
190. Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1007, 1020 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court was 
influenced by the fact that Congress had considered and rejected cross-examination 
in this type of EPA rulemaking. Id. 
191. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 
819,834 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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air, the court was unwilling to order the agency to allow cross-examina-
tion of medical and scientific witnesses who had testified at the public 
hearing held on the proposed rules. 192 Vermont Yankee has had a similar 
influence in cases involving efforts to have the court impose separation of 
function requirements,193 cost/benefit analysis,194 additional procedures 
with respect to agency subpoenas,195 mandatory inclusion of related is-
sues in a single rulemaking proceeding,196 reopening, and limitations on 
ex parte contacts. 197 
One area in which Vermont Yankee has had noticeable impact upon 
the D.C. Circuit is in that of exempt rulemaking. The idea that courts 
could impose notice-and-comment procedures in the promulgation of 
rules otherwise exempt from the procedural requirements of § 553 of the 
APA had been applied, before Vermont Yankee, when the rule was 
deemed to have "substantial impact on the rights and interests of private 
parties."198 Vermont Yankee has led the D.C. Circuit to conclude that 
this form of judical activism is no longer permissible. In Cabais v. Eg-
ger ,199 the court observed that "substantial impact" is an insufficent jus-
tification to require notice and comment if a rule is otherwise exempt, 
and that it is not "an independent basis for determining the applicability 
of APA procedures. . . ."200 In Cabais, most of the agency's directive 
was found to be interpretative, and therefore not subject to notice and 
comment by the explicit terms of § 553 of the APA.201 The court 
reached the same result in American Postal Workers Union v. United 
States Postal Service. 202 It declined to apply the "substantial impact" 
test/°3 and "decline[d] to require OPM to engage in procedures not re-
quired by the APA" in light of Vermont Yankee. 204 The court would do 
192. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1169-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1042 (1980). 
193. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
194. American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 665 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
("[T]his court may not require OSHA to conduct cost-benefit analysis unless the 
agency or Congress officially requires the procedure. Such analysis is certainly not 
mandated in explicit terms by the statute. Nor is it implicated in the extra-statutory 
procedures OSHA followed .... "), affd in part. rev'd in part sub nom. American 
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
195. FTC v. Brigadier Indus. Corp., 613 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
196. Earth Resources Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 617 F.2d 775, 777-79 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (claim was that consideration of one issue in the present rulemak-
ing proceeding would render later hearings on other issues meaningless). 
197. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 397-404 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
198. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See supra text 
accompanying notes 63-73, and 112-18 for a discussion of the recent course of the 
"substantial impact" test in the district courts and other courts of appeals. 
199. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
200. Id. at 237. 
201. Id. at 237-38. 
202. 707 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984). 
203. Id. at 560. 
204. Id. at 565 n.11. 
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no more than suggest that notice and comment was "advisable," 
although not required.205 
Today the expected result is that once the determination is made 
that a rule is exempt, the inquiry ends-that is, the court will not impose 
notice and comment. 206 Stewart v. Smith concerned a challenge to the 
Bureau of Prisons's policy of considering only persons under the age of 
thirty-five for jobs within correctional facilities. 207 One assertion was 
that the policy was procedurally defective because it had not been 
promulgated by notice and comment procedures. The court concluded 
that the policy was exempt, stating: "The desirability of procedural safe-
guards. . . is not the issue in this case. Instead the question before us is 
simply whether the APA required notice and comment rulemaking when 
this policy was formulated. If it did not, we cannot invalidate this maxi-
mum age rule. See Vermont Yankee . ... "208 
At the other end of the spectrum, the D.C. Circuit will not hesitate 
to perform traditional judicial functions in the review of rulemaking. 
Because the Commission intimates that its procedural decisions 
are insulated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ver-
mont Yankee . . . it is worth noting the holding in that case 
. . . . Thus the case restricts the ability of courts to refashion 
normal rulemaking procedures with judicially-conceived no-
tions of administrative fair play. It has no bearing on the 
power of courts to interpret and apply congressional 
directives.209 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit will not allow, for example, 
assertions of the principles of Vermont Yankee to bar it from perform-
ance of the traditional functions of judicial review. If an agency's expla-
nation of the basis for its decision is inadequate or fails to address 
alternatives that it reasonably should have, the court will remand for 
further consideration,210 notwithstanding that Vermont Yankee does not 
allow the court the "power to contest the rationality of the substantive 
decisions .... "211 
205. Id. at 564-65. 
206. See infra text accompanying notes 273-77 for a discussion of Batterton v. Marshall, 
648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) in which Judge Bazelon found it unnecessary to 
reject the "substantial impact" test and suggested it may still provide a basis for 
analysis of the question of availability of a statutory exemption. 
207. 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
208. Id. at 496 n.37. Judge Wright dissented on the ground that the policy did not fall 
within the APA exemption for "matter[s] relating to agency management or person-
nel." Id. at 500-06. 
209. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 619 n.lO (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (issue of propriety of ex parte contacts in rulemaking not ripe for judicial 
review). 
210. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 815-17 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (repeal of rule containing restrictions on "homework" in the knit-
ted outerwear business). 
211. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 
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The AP A itself may provide the basis for such decisions, since it 
requires a statement of basis and purpose with the final rule. 212 If the 
court is simply carrying out the intent of Congress as expressed by the 
AP A's requirement of a statement of basis and purpose, then there is no 
conflict with Vermont Yankee. 213 
The more difficult and interesting aspects of response and reaction 
to Vermont Yankee in the D.C. Circuit lie between those cases in which 
Vermont Yankee clearly has been followed and those in which it clearly 
need not be. Here is where one is likely to discover, if at all, the resist-
ance which Judge Scalia predicted and lamented.214 
The exceptions to Vermont Yankee 215 have been considered by the 
court in several cases. In Lead Industries Association v. EPA,216 one chal-
lenge involved the agency's denial of cross-examination of medical and 
scientific witnesses who testified at the hearing on the EPA's proposed 
rules.217 The court rejected the argument that it should intervene on the 
basis of the Vermont Yankee exceptions. Judge Wright observed that the 
petitioner has an "extremely heavy burden in its attempt to persuade the 
court to impose on EPA a procedure that is not required by statute" and 
that it is "absolutely clear that courts must be extremely reticent."218 
In another claim for additional requirements in rulemaking, Judge 
Wright again discussed the Vermont Yankee exceptions. In this instance, 
the assertion was that Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) staff attorneys who were advocates for an OSHA rule had been 
consulted by the decisionmaker in development of the final rule. 219 The 
court examined the AP A and the OSHA enabling statute and could "dis-
cern no statutory basis in either the AP A or the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act for a separation of function requirement in OSHA rulemak-
1440 n.86 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (remanded in part for the agency to give adequate con-
sideration to the issue of elimination of program logs.). 
212. Independent United States Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 918-20 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 
1978); Note, The Need For an Additional Notice and Comment Period When Final 
Rules Differ Substantially from Interim Rules, 1981 DUKE L. J. 377,388 (Vermont 
Yankee does not preclude imposition of additional procedures in furtherance of sec-
tion 553 purposes). 
213. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981), offers a combination of the 
issues of adequacy of the statement of reasons and of exempt rulemaking. It was 
argued that the AP A required more stringent and independent findings than the 
underlying statute, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court disagreed, 
noting that the underlying statute did have a reasons requirement, that it saw "no 
need to engraft other provisions onto those found in this comprehensive statute," 
and that the rules were in any event exempt from the AP A in that they related to 
public property. Id. at 1322 n.154. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78. 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
216. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). 
217. Id. at 1169-71 (rules concerned lead in ambient air). 
218. Id. at 1169. 
219. United steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
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ing, and under the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, that is 
virtually the end of the inquiry."220 The judge noted that this finding 
does not end the matter entirely if due process rights are violated or if 
there are" 'extremely compelling circumstances' in which the courts re-
main free to impose nonconsitutional extra-statutory procedures on 
agencies."221 Nevertheless, the court was not inclined to explore the ex-
ceptions; rather, it looked to the Home Box Office - U.S. Lines prece-
dents,222 which it felt had survived Vermont Yankee, distinguished those 
cases on the ground that neither involved improper influence or ex parte 
contacts with agency staff members and the decisionmakers, and con-
cluded that the rule was procedurally correct.223 
Lead Industries Association and United Steelworkers of America v. 
Marsha1l 224 illustrate that the D.C. Circuit has neither invoked nor 
probed the exceptions to Vermont Yankee as a means of achieving what 
the Supreme Court prohibited. Further evidence of this can be found in 
cases concerning other EPA rules,22s Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission design specifications for the Alaskan natural gas transmission 
system,226 and directives concerning statutory requirements that states 
offset unemployment compensation payments by the amount of pension 
or retirement benefits received by unemployed claimants.227 
One possible means of limiting the impact of Vermont Yankee is to 
220. Id. at 1212-14. 
221. Id. at 1214. 
222. See generally infra text accompanying notes 278-316. 
223. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
224.Id. 
225. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court stated that it would 
reverse only if "the statutory requirements, or the procedures reasonably inferable 
from them or from basic notions of constitutional due process were breached by 
EPA" or there were substantial departures from statutory requirements. Id. at 392. 
It noted the general rule that there are no due process constraints in rulemaking, id. 
at 392 n.462, and refused to interfere with respect to comments received during the 
post-comment period, EPA's refusal to reopen the comment period, ex parte con-
tacts with persons outside the agency, and intra-Executive branch meetings. Id. at 
397408. 
226. Earth Resources Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 617 F.2d 775 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). In the face of a claimed deprivation of due process because the agency 
decided certain issues in rulemaking in isolation from related issues, the court con-
cluded that no protected liberty or property interest had been identified and small 
numbers of persons were not individually affected so as to justify invoking due pro-
cess in rulemaking. Id. at 777-79. It observed: 
Complainants' contention of 'piecemeal adjudication' does not actually 
state a due process claim, but rather an attack on the Commission's choice 
to structure its proceedings on an issue-by-issue basis. The Supreme Court 
has affirmed in the clearest terms that agencies have broad discretion to 
fashion their own procedures. 
Id. at 778. 
227. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court was not willing to find 
that constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances justified the 
imposition of notice and comment procedures in exempt rulemaking. Id. at 237 n.2. 
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construe it narrowly and confine it to its facts. The D.C. Circuit has 
done so on occasion. In Las Cruces TV Cable v. FCC,228 which involved 
an agency acting in an adjudicatory context, the court put Vermont Yan-
kee to the side by noting that the case warned the courts not to impose 
procedures beyond those required by the AP A or desired by the agency 
in informal rulemaking and that, consequently, the case was not disposi-
tive.229 The court, however, still took from Vermont Yankee the gui-
dance that it "serves to caution us against instructing the agency how to 
adjudicate a refund dispute without good reason. "230 
Geller v. FCC23! presents a somewhat more subtle limitation of Ver-
mont Yankee, one which may reveal inconsistency. Geller involved 
rulemaking, but the concern was not the internal workings of the process 
following proposal of the rule; rather, the issue was the FCC's denial of a 
rulemaking petition. The petitioner wanted the agency to reconsider, 
through rulemaking, an existing rule on cable television policies that he 
felt was no longer in the public interest because of changed circum-
stances.232 The FCC denied the petition, but the court disagreed and 
ordered "that the Commission must reexamine the regulatory remnants 
of the consensus agreement [the original rule] for some discernable con-
tribution to the public interest, and we leave to the Commission in the 
first instance the procedures through which that will be done."233 The 
Geller court made clear that it did "not mean to imply that this inquiry 
must necessarily be conducted in a new rulemaking proceeding 
.... "234 Concerning Vermont Yankee, it commented, "we do not en-
counter the strictures on imposition of judicially-created requirements on 
the rulemaking process recently highlighted in ... " that case.235 
The court in Geller thus alleviated the "Vermont Yankee problem" 
by confining the Vermont Yankee rule to prohibition of judicial interfer-
ence only with the internal workings of the rulemaking process. The 
court's insistence that it was not requiring any particular procedural ap-
proach that the agency should follow on remand had the same effect. Its 
suggestion, however, that the choice belongs to the agency "in the first 
instance" seems inconsistent with the implication of Vermont Yankee 
that such choices are for Congress in the first instance, the agency in the 
last instance, and the courts nowhere in between. The effect of the Geller 
228. 645 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
229. Id. at 1049. 
230.Id. 
231. 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
232. Id. at 976. 
233. Id. at 980 n.59 (emphasis added). 
234.Id. 
235. Id. at 980 n.58; see also ITT Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1245-46 
(1983) (In considering denial of a petition for rulemaking, the court distinguished 
between issues of discretion in fashioning additional rulemaking procedures, the 
agency's province under Vermont Yankee, and issues of statutory compliance in 
which die court has the responsibility of a more "exacting" review), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 
1936 (1984). 
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decision is to compel an agency "to exercise its discretion" to take an 
action that the agency does not consider necessary and desirable. The 
technique of limiting Vermont Yankee to its facts is an effective means for 
the court to retain an active, meaningful role in judicial review of agency 
decision making. Yet neither this technique nor its result - retaining a 
meaningful judicial review - seems judicially presumptuous. 
In contrast, there have been numerous occasions in which the D.C. 
Circuit has examined and applied perceived notions of Vermont Yankee 
outside the context of informal rulemaking, and has in no sense limited 
the reach of the Vermont Yankee rule. In these cases, the court has done 
the opposite; this represents as much cooperation with the "spirit" of 
Vermont Yankee as one could reasonably expect, and more. Vermont 
Yankee has been cited as authority for a decision declining to require 
additional procedures with respect to the issuance of protective orders by 
the Federal Trade Commission,236 for a decision reversing a district 
court's imposition of additional procedures in the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's approval of a television antenna,237 and for a decision re-
fusing to impose additional procedures in the process of administrative 
approval of Postal Service rate increases.238 There are many other such 
examples in the D.C. Circuit that implement the view extracted from 
Vermont Yankee that it is "well-settled that administrative agencies en-
joy a broad discretion in the manner of carrying out their statutory func-
tions and responsibilities,"239 including in cases outside the context of 
236. Exxon Corp. v. FrC, 665 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (The court rejected 
the argument that an administrative law judge could not exercise the agency's pro-
tective order authority: "Provided the Commission's procedure for the issuance of 
protective orders is consistent with the governing statutes and the Constitution, as is 
patent in this case, it is not subject to further judicial review."); FrC v. Anderson, 
631 F.2d 741,746 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court dismissed arguments challenging the ade-
quacy of a protective order and noted that "formulation of procedural rules is 
within the discretion of the agency, and our review is limited to determining consis-
tency with governing statutes and the Constitution"); accord FrC v. Owens-Corn-
ing Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (District court erred in 
imposing conditions on FrC subpoenas: "Agencies are free to determine their own 
procedures as long as they do not violate constitutional or statutory safeguards."). 
237. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965, 970 
n.25 (D.C. CiT. 1979) (district court's remand in adjudication to require additional 
procedures "indirectly" violates the procedural discretion that Congress placed in 
the agency: "Additionally, requiring procedural safeguards not statutorily man-
dated violates the Supreme Court's prohibition ... " in Vermont Yankee). 
238. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 607 F.2d 
392,421 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Tamm, J., concurring) (court must decline "to add 
the judicial veneer of a non-statutory requirement that the Governor find a PRC 
decision 'wholly acceptable' in order to approve it" and "may not require more than 
the minimum statutory procedures or impose procedures designed to achieve the 
'best' result"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
239. Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 
499 (D.C. CiT. 1980). The agency had approved amendment of a license permitting 
a municipal utility to raise the height of its dam, and initiated a separate proceeding 
to consider downstream consequences. The intervenors argued that the latter issue 
should have been addressed by reopening the initial proceeding rather than by open-
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informal rulemaking.24O 
There is, however, more evidence of resistance to Vermont Yankee 
in the D.C. Circuit than in either the district courts or the other courts of 
appeals. Thus, the cases just described do not present the entire picture 
for proceedings other than rulemaking. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,241 the court remanded a 
ratemaking order because the agency had failed to apply the appropriate 
legal criteria.242 In the portion of the opinion devoted to "Latitude on 
Remand," the court indicated that the agency had the discretion under 
the applicable statute "to use its equitable discretion and to choose alter-
native procedures or mechanisms to formulate and to effectuate its judge-
ment."243 Yet, the court then proceeded to offer a variety of suggestions 
as to how the agency might exercise its discretion,244 emphasizing: 
that while the court has identified a number of factors for con-
sideration by the Commission, it is aware that the appraisal and 
ing a separate and subsequent proceeding. Id. at 509·10. Judge Wald, in dissent, 
agreed that Vermont Yankee cautions that fundamental policy questions are for 
Congress and not for the courts. He nevertheless felt that the court could not meet 
its responsibility to review for consistency with legislative intent when "the decision 
itself was splintered" in more than one proceeding. Id. at 517-18. 
240. City of Ukiah v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 729 F.2d 793, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (dictum) (evidentiary hearing was not required in issuance of an order al-
lowing a county water authority to study the feasibility of operating a hydroelectric 
facility); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 707 
F.2d 1507, 1512 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (agency refused to waive its rule to allow 
automatic rate adjustments, and the court observed that "while we lack authority to 
command an agency to afford a petitioner a procedural opportunity not required by 
law, see Vermont Yankee . .. , the agency itself is not similarly limited."); North 
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in an injunction 
proceeding involving lease of federal oil and gas properties, the court noted that 
"the Supreme Court [in Vermont Yankee] has warned of the impropriety offederal 
courts introducing additional procedural or substantive standards into statutory 
provisions for administrative action."); Carolina, C. & o. Ry. v. ICC, 593 F.2d 
1305, 1313 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in ICC ratemaking, the court "contemplate[d] 
that the Commission will devise appropriately expedited procedures to avoid all 
escapable delay," although choice of hearing procedures was within the discretion 
of the agency "in the first instance"); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[A]s a general rule, the agency, not 
the court, enlarges the minimum procedures prescribed by statute."); Porter County 
Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 
606 F.2d 1363, 1369 n.15, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in refusing to intervene in the 
agency's decision not to institute license revocation proceedings, the court, citing 
Vermont Yankee, noted that the agency has wide discretion in such matters); In re 
FfC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 695-96, 696-97 n.55 (D.C. 
Cir.) ("The Commission exercised its discretion to permit greater procedural access 
to the decision-making process . . . than was required" in a proceeding that was 
investigatory and neither an adjudication nor a rulemaking), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
959 (1978). 
241. 606 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). 
242.Id. 
243. Id. at 1119. 
244. Id. at 1120. 
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weighing of these factors is the function of the agency and not 
the court. It is not an encroachment on the agency's ultimate 
discretion either that the court has identified a number of fac-
tors for consideration . . . or a particular emphasis should be 
given a certain factor.245 
299 
The practical effect of the court's "suggestions" may well be to require 
indirectly what the court appears to feel it may not do directly without 
running counter to Vermont Yankee. 
In other cases, the D.C. Circuit has been more direct. In Independ-
ent U.S. Tanker Owners Commission v. Lewis,246 both the informal 
rulemaking and adjudicatory actions of the Maritime Administration 
were challenged.247 On the informal adjUdication aspects of the case, the 
court noted "the distinct and steady trend of the courts has been to de-
mand in informal adjudications procedures similar to those already re-
quired in informal rulemaking. "248 It went on to point out that 
notwithstanding Vermont Yankee's dictum "that courts may not add to 
the procedural requirements of the APA except in 'extremely rare' cir-
cumstances, we are justified in demanding some sort of procedures for 
notice, comment, and a statement of reasons as a necessary means of 
carrying out our responsibility for a thorough and searching review.249 
In Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus,250 the court relied on due process and the 
dictates of the underlying statute to reach a similar conclusion.251 In 
Koniag, the Secretary of the Interior had decided that certain Alaskan 
villages were not entitled to lands and funds. The Secretary had consid-
ered the recommended decisions of the administrative law judge and the 
agency's appeal board and reached his decision before the recommenda-
tions were made available to the parties.252 Even though this proceeding 
was not subject to the AP A's requirements mandating an opportunity for 
comment and exceptions to the recommendations prior to the Secretary's 
final decision, the court nevertheless concluded that denial of these op-
portunities was improper.253 Concerning Vermont Yankee, it stated: 
The Supreme Court's recent decision . . . does not require a 
different result. In that case, the Court held that a reviewing 
court may not dictate to an agency the methods and procedures 
to be followed to develop an adequate record for judicial review 
. . . . Our holding today does not trench upon this principle. 
We hold only that the Secretary's secret review process is in-
245. Id. at 1121. 
246. 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
247.Id. 
248. Id. at 922. 
249. Id. at 923. 
250. 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 608. 
253. Id. at 609. 
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consistent with both constitutional constraints and the mandate 
of ANCSA [Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act] that Natives 
participate as fully as possible in the decisionmaking.254 
In Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,255 the court consid-
ered the effect of Vermont Yankee in connection with judicial authority 
over consent decrees.256 The district court had denied a motion to vacate 
a settlement agreement, and one issue on appeal was whether, by making 
the agreement itself, the court had improperly infringed upon the 
agency's discretion.257 Specifically, the charge was that the district 
court's judicial decree dictated the approach to be taken in promulgating 
rules. 258 
The court found the decree to be largely the doing of the EPA and 
not the district court, that the latter's role had been confined to determin-
ing that the decree was fair and consistent with the statute, and that this 
did not conflict with Vermont Yankee. 259 Judge Wilkey, in dissent, said 
the power to adopt consent decrees is limited by statute, and that Ver-
mont Yankee precludes judicial prescription of rules of procedure; thus, 
the majority had condoned "government by consent decree."260 
It should be noted, however, that these cases and some others261 
that seem to set Vermont Yankee aside arose outside the confines of in-
formal rulemaking procedures. In such cases there is danger of mistak-
254. Id. at 610. Although the court did not explicitly make the point, it may have been 
acting consistently with Vermont Yankee under the theory of the "constitutional 
constraints" exception. It did quote the pertinent language from the Supreme 
Court's opinion. Id. 
255.718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984). 
256.Id. 
257. Id. at 1120. 
258. Id. at 1127. 
259. Id. at 1128. 
260. Id. at 1131, 1137. 
261. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 660 F.2d 
773, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (In a case challenging certain agreements 
between state and national political party committees, the majority found that the 
agreements violated the applicable statute, notwithstanding the agency's interpreta-
tion. In dissent, Judge Wilkey observed: "The penchant of this court to give no 
deference whatsoever to the responsible agency's interpretation of its role and basic 
statute has been noted with acerbity by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee 
.... " Id. at 782 n.2.), rev'd, 454 U.S. 27 (1981); Seatrain Int'l, S.A. v. Federal 
Maritime Comm'n, 598 F.2d 289, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("We emphasize that our 
earlier opinion expressly stated that the Commission had no duty to provide full 
'evidentiary' hearings. We have no wish to straight-jacket the agency with proce-
dural requirements unrelated to its responsibilities. Still, the Commission must per-
form its duties with a full understanding of the economic and commercial situation. 
We cannot find that the Order on Remand, reached without consideration of then-
current industry conditions or agency policy, was based on a review of all relevant 
factors."); Public Servo Comm'n V. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.2d 
542, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robb, J., dissenting) (dissent asserted that the majority 
had involved itself in matters of policy which were the province of the agency and 
not the court, and which "were settled by the Commission when it established the 
optional procedure" in its order approving a certificate for a natural gas producer). 
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ing a legitimate distinction of inapposite precedent for resistance. This 
risk does not exist in certain D.C. Circuit rulemaking cases in which 
Vermont Yankee has been considered, and in those cases one can find 
evidence that the court, or at least some of its members, may be inclined 
to question the Supreme Court's teaching, and perhaps challenge its lead-
ership in developing the law in this area. 
Weyerhauser v. Costle 262 upheld the EPA's rules limiting effluent 
discharges, with the exception of certain rules pertaining to the paper 
industry.263 Yet the court's opinion is laden with philosophic conflict 
with Vermont Yankee, which is a product of its perception of the general 
role of a court in judicial review of rulemaking. Thus, it suggested that a 
court may review procedures in rulemaking to make certain that they are 
"ample enough to support their substantive cargo."264 
Even more so than our review of EPA's statutory interpreta-
tions, our review of its procedural integrity in promulgating the 
regulations before us is the product of our independent judg-
ment, and our main reliance in ensuring that, despite its broad 
discretion, the Agency has not acted unfairly or in disregard of 
its statutorily prescribed procedures. . . . Our assertion of ju-
dicial independence in carrying out the procedural aspect of the 
review function derives from the country's historical reliance 
on the courts as the exponents of procedural fairness . . . . 
Recently, this reliance has transcended cases arising under 
either of the due process clauses and has infused modem no-
tions of administrative law, in particular in the area of informal 
rulemaking. . . . 
Our reliance on careful procedural review, moreover, de-
rives from an expectation that if the Agency, in carrying out its 
'essentially legislative task,' has infused the administrative pro-
cess with the degree of openness, explanation, and participatory 
democracy required by the AP A, it will thereby have "ne-
gate[d] the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the for-
mulation of rules . . . . Even here, however, beyond the 
notice, comment, and explanation requirements of section 553 
of the AP A, it is generally up to the Agency to select among 
the myriad available techniques to accomplish the goal of pub-
lic understanding and participation. Vermont Yankee . ... 265 
In this setting Vermont Yankee seems more afterthought and counter-
point than it does controlling precedent.266 
262. 590 F.2d lOll (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
263.Id. 
264. Id. at 1024 n.ll. 
265. Id. at 1027-28 (citations omitted). 
266. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980), also involved judicial 
review of EPA rules, in this instance new discharge source performance standards. 
The court found insufficient support in the rulemaking record and a need for a more 
adequate explanation. It indicated that the scope of its review "does not presage 
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Judge Bazelon's decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,267 Vermont Yankee on 
remand to the D.C. Circuit, and Judge Wilkey's dissent were discussed in 
the introduction to this section.268 Judge Wilkey had suggested that the 
majority had adopted the "too hard a look" doctrine, in conflict with 
Vermont Yankee. 269 This was not the first time a colleague had accused 
the majority of taking "too hard a look" at the agency's rulemaking rec-
ord. In Public Systems v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,270 the 
court remanded an agency rule for failure to assess the implications of its 
actions and for failure adequately to explain its purposes.271 Judge Robb 
dissented: 
The court reaches its conclusion by asserting that 'substantial 
evidence' must support the 'factual predicate' on which the 
Commission rule is promulgated. It then invalidates the rule 
on the ground that it lacks adequate support in the record. To 
invalidate the Commission's order on this ground is, in effect, 
to reject the ordinary procedures of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Informal rulemaking does not necessarily involve 
either the creation of a record sufficient to withstand review 
under a substantial evidence standard or findings of the kind 
most susceptible to judicial review. . . . 
The thesis of the majority is untenable in light of the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee . ... 272 
Again, the judicial record indicates conflict in philosophy as to the 
proper role of the court in review of informal rulemaking. 
Further evidence of this philosophical conflict is found in Batterton 
v. Marshall. 273 The Department of Labor failed to employ notice-and-
comment procedures in adopting a new method to compute unemploy-
ment statistics, and the court held that the agency's action constituted a 
rule that was not exempt from APA procedures.274 Judge Bazelon ex-
pressly distinguished Vermont Yankee on the ground that "in the instant 
case ... the sole question is whether DOL employed the minimal proce-
any new or more stringent standard" than the established "hard look" standard. [d. 
at 451. The court's discussion of the standard relies extensively on traditional pre-
Vermont Yankee precedent without addressing the impact of Vermont Yankee. /d. 
at 451-54. The case has the air of "business as usual." 
267. 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). 
268. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89. 
269. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459,517,520-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). 
270. 606 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
271. [d. 
272. [d. at 983-85 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
273. 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
274. [d. at 699-708. 
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dural requirements established by statute. . . . "275 
This analysis alone seems apparently unremarkable in its relation-
ship to Vermont Yankee. Although it seems consistent, dicta with re-
spect to the possibility of employing the "substantial impact" test to 
impose notice and comment in otherwise exempt rulemaking suggests 
that the court's analysis strays from the principle, if not the strictly inter-
preted rule, of Vermont Yankee. As noted above,276 other D.C. Circuit 
decisions indicate the demise of the "substantial impact" test as a basis 
for imposing additional procedures. In Batterton, Judge Bazelon refuses 
to reject it, at least as a means to determine whether the agency action is 
of a type that is exempt from the AP A's notice and comment 
requirement: 
DOL suggests in the instant case that the "substantial impact" 
test may put a court in the posture of appearing to require pro-
cedures beyond those mandated by statute or voluntarily 
adopted by the agency, and in that fashion deviate from the 
implications of Vermont Yankee . .. we do not rely on the 
"substantial impact" analysis. Nonetheless, we find no reason 
to doubt the continued viability of the "substantial impact" 
test, as it simply articulates one of the several criteria for evalu-
ating claims of exemption from section 553.277 
If Judge Bazelon were to use the substantial impact test as a means to 
find an otherwise exempt rule not exempt, and therefore subject to notice 
and comment, he would, in effect, have imposed procedures upon the 
agency - procedures that the agency had found unnecessary. Thus, the 
idea of imposing procedures in rulemaking obviously is not dead in all 
quarters. 
One of the more celebrated examples of judicial imposition of non-
statutory requirements in informal rulemaking is in the area of ex parte 
contacts. Under the APA, ex parte communications that are relevant to 
the merits of a rule between interested persons outside an agency and the 
decisionmakers within the agency are prohibited. If such communica-
tions nevertheless occur, they must be placed on the public record.278 
This provision does not, however, apply to informal rulemaking; it ap-
plies only in cases of formal adjudication and formal rulemaking.279 That 
Congress did not apply this section to informal rulemaking is consistent 
with traditional notions of rulemaking procedure under which ex parte 
contacts had been an accepted and a lawful practice.280 
275. Id. at 707. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 198-208. 
277. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708-09 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
278. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982). 
279. The procedures for formal rulemaking, that is, rulemaking "on the record after an 
opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982), and for formal adjudica-
tion, 5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982), are set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1982). 
280. Action for Children's Television, Inc. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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The legitimacy of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking was al-
tered dramatically in 1977. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,281 the D.C. 
Circuit concluded: 
Once a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued. . . any 
agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be ex-
pected to be involved in the decisional process of the rulemak-
ing proceeding should 'refus[e] to discuss matters relating to 
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any inter-
ested private party, or an attorney or agent for any such party, 
prior to the [agency's] decision' . . . . If ex parte contacts 
nonetheless occur, we think that any written document or a 
summary of any oral communication must be placed in the 
public file established for each rulemaking docket immediately 
after the communication is received so that interested parties 
may comment thereon.282 
The court based its conclusion on several considerations, including the 
need for and "benefit of adversarial discussion among the parties, "283 
"the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of fairness im-
plicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on 
the merits which undergirds all of our administrative law,"284 and the 
fear of "one administrative record for the public and this court and an-
other for the Commission and those 'in the know'. "285 
The implications of the case were immediately questioned in the 
D.C. Circuit itself. It has been suggested that Home Box Office was only 
"momentarily the law of the D.C. Circuit"286 as a consequence of Action 
for Children's Television, Inc. v. FCC.287 Although the latter did not 
overrule Home Box Office, it refused to apply it retroactively "inasmuch 
as it constitutes a clear departure from established law"288 suggested that 
Home Box Office might be limited to rulemaking requiring "resolution of 
conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege,"289 and perhaps con-
fined it to ex parte contacts when "it appears from the administrative 
record under review that they may have materially influenced the action 
ultimately taken. "290 
Vermont Yankee placed the continuing vitality of Home Box Office 
in even greater doubt. Some commentators thought it was dead,291 some 
281. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
282. [d. at 57 (citation omitted). 
283. [d. at 55. 
284. [d. at 56. 
285. [d. at 54. 
286. 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 533 (1978). 
287. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
288. [d. at 474. 
289. [d. at 476. 
290. [d. 
291. E.g., Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White 
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thought the contrary,292 and some were understandably uncertain.293 
The D.C. Circuit's response has been mixed. In Sierra Club v. Costle,294 
the court refused to extend Home Box Office, and thus declined to invali-
date an EPA rule that resulted from a proceeding which included ex 
parte contacts with individuals outside the agency after the close of the 
comment period.295 In Iowa State Commerce Commission v. Office of 
Federal Inspector,296 the court distinguished Home Box Office on its 
facts, and added that the ex parte contacts at issue "did not violate basic 
tenets of fairness."297 In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,298 
the court was not willing to extend Home Box Office to "apply the ban 
on ex parte contacts to agency staff" dealings with OSHA deci-
sionmakers in developing a standard for lead in the workplace.299 Yet 
none of these cases expressly overruled Home Box Office; other decisions 
of the D.C. Circuit reveal that it is not likely to do so. 
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission 3°O con-
cerned an order approving an amendment and extension of a joint service 
agreement between two water common carriers.301 A competing shipper, 
United States Lines, petitioned for review and the D.C. Circuit re-
manded. One issue was the propriety of "secret ex parte contacts [that] 
were employed both to introduce new arguments and positions and to 
respond to and rebut arguments which protestant USL made in its public 
filings."302 
Although the underlying statute provided for notice and a hearing, 
the court concluded that the hearing need not be formal and treated the 
FMC's decision as informal adjudication.303 Thus, the proceeding was 
House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 976-78 (1980) (Home Box Office would seem to 
"fly in the face" of Vermont Yankee). 
292. See, e.g., Preston, A Right of Rebuttal in Informal Rulemaking: May Courts Impose 
Procedures to Ensure Rebuttal of Ex Parte Communications and Information De-
rived from Agency Files After Vermont Yankee?, 32 AD. L. REV. 621, 625 (1982); 
Note, Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure - Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 314, 331-32 (it is suggested that Home Box Office 
may survive because its due process underpinnings fall within Vermont Yankee's 
"constitutional constraints" exception). 
293. E.g., Gellhom & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process'~' An Inconclusive Dialogue, 
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (1981) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont 
Yankee, invalidating judicial imposition of special procedures on agency rulemak-
ing, compounds the uncertainty, especially inasmuch as the decision itself has an 
unclear future."). 
294. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
295. Id. at 400-03. 
296. 730 F.2d 1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
297. Id. at 1576. 
298. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
299. Id. at 1214. The majority also distinguished Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 
126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which it had intimated that it might, in an appropriate 
case in the future, bar such ex parte contacts. 647 F.2d at 1215-16. 
300. 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 538. 
303. Id. at 526, 536-37. 
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not subject to the AP A's express statutory prohibition of ex parte con-
tacts in formal rulemaking and adjudication. Nevertheless, the court 
noted "the inconsistency of secret ex parte contacts with the notion of a 
fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process 
.... "304 This denial of an opportunity for United States Lines to par-
ticipate effectively in the proceeding was found "to do violence not only 
to [the underlying statute] but to the basic fairness concept of due process 
as well."305 In addition, the court found that the secret contacts "fore-
close[d] effective judicial review of the agency's final decision according 
to the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure 
Act."306 
In reaching this result, the court made clear its recognition that 
Home Box Office involved informal rulemaking and not informal adjudi-
cation as in this case. 307 The court's purpose, however, was not to distin-
guish Home Box Office; the point was but one step on the path to 
explaining why the principles of Home Box Office were relevant here. It 
said, "Moreover, however we label the proceedings involved here and in 
our earlier cases the common theme remains: that ex parte communica-
tions and agency secrecy as to their substance and existence serve effec-
tively to deprive the public of the right to participate meaningfully in the 
decisionmaking process. "308 
On the relationship between its findings and Vermont Yankee, the 
court observed: 
Nor is our conclusion here inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee. . .. 
The freedom of administrative agencies to fashion their 
own procedures recognized in Vermont Yankee, however, does 
not encompass freedom to ignore statutory requirements. . . . 
Nor does Vermont Yankee provide a basis for agency proce-
dures or practices which effectively foreclose judicial review 
where, as here, such review is provided for by statute. Nothing 
in that decision calls into question the well established princi-
ple, found in the Administrative Procedure Act and in the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, that the court is required to 
conduct a "searching and careful" inquiry to determine 
whether agency action is arbitrary or capricious, or, in appro-
priate cases, supported by substantial evidence. . . .309 
The anomaly, of course, is that if it is so obvious that the APA does not 
preclude, and may even require this result, what is one to make of the 
extensive provision on ex parte contacts that Congress put in the AP A, 
304. Id. at 539. 
305. Id. at 541. 
306. Id. at 541-42. 
307. Id. at 539. 
308. Id. at 540. 
309. Id. at 542. 
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and limited to formal rulemaking and formal adjudication?310 
Whether Home Box Office and its progeny should have survived 
Vermont Yankee remains an issue because they have survived. The com-
mentators generally recognize this;3!! the D.C. Circuit has as well. In 
United Steelworkers of America, Inc. v. Marshall,3!2 for example, it noted 
that, in Home Box Office, the court went beyond the strict terms of the 
AP A and the underlying statute to ban ex parte contacts and that this 
position was reaffirmed in United States Lines.313 It seems that the court 
will do no more than distinguish Home Box Office in some cases,3!4 while 
extending it in others. 
In his commentary before joining the bench, Judge Scalia roundly 
criticized the decision in United States Lines, believing that it "fiout[ed] 
the Supreme Court's guidance in Vermont Yankee . . . ., cites repeat-
edly ... a virtual rogue's gallery of ... the swashbuckling D.C. Circuit 
opinions ... ," and is "cause for serious professional concern."3!5 
Nothing in the subsequent judicial record suggests reason for him to con-
clude otherwise today.3!6 
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF SUPREME 
COURT LEADERSHIP IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 
Predictions that Vermont Yankee would not take an important place 
310. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
considered the ex parte contact issue in connection with an ICC investigation pro-
ceeding which it characterized as "informal rulemaking" with the additional statu-
tory requirement of a non-adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 350. It found "such contacts 
... offensive in two fundamental respects: (1) they violate the basic fairness of a 
hearing which ostensibly assures the public a right to participate in agency decision-
making, and (2) they foreclose effective judicial review of the agency's final deci-
sion." Id. at 351. It turned to Home Box Office and u.s. Lines for support, id. at 
351 n.49, and cited the latter in placing Vermont Yankee to the side. Id. at 351 n.46. 
311. Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH 
L. REV. 3, 16; DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Pol-
icy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 316-18 (1979); Preston, supra note 292, at 625; Stewart, 
supra note 24, at 1816-17 n.49; cf Verkuil, supra note 291, at 978 (Verkuil suggests 
that U.S. Lines may be consistent with Vermont Yankee because it concerned infor-
mal adjudication and the APA ignores that form of administrative action, whereas 
Home Box Office involves informal rulemaking, which is expressly covered by the 
APA, thus making Home Box Office inconsistent with Vermont Yankee). 
312. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
313. Id. at 1214. 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98. 
315. Scalia, supra note 38, at 397-99. 
316. Cf Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 
3532 (1984). The circuit court found the Food and Drug Administration arbitrary 
and capricious in declining to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction to consider asser-
tions that use of certain drugs for capital punishment violated the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Judge Scalia, in dissent, said that the majority's imposi-
tion of a reasons requirement was "one of those novel procedural requirements we 
have been told not to invent. Vermont Yankee . ... " Id. at 1198 n.6 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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in administrative law were incorrect. The frequency with which the 
lower federal courts have turned to it in the past six years alone demon-
strates this. Less clear is whether the case has had the effects which the 
Supreme Court intended. 
If, as does seem reasonably clear, the unanimous Court intended to 
rein in judicial activism in review of informal rulemaking in general, and 
the imposition of additional procedures in informal rulemaking in partic-
ular, the results are inconclusive. It has been generally effective where 
leadership was probably least needed - in the district courts and the 
courts of appeals other than the D.C. Circuit. In the latter, where the 
consensus seems to be that the leadership was most needed, the efficacy 
of the Court's leadership is more modest. Evidence of resistance to Ver-
mont Yankee is both quantitatively and qualitatively greater in the D.C. 
Circuit than elsewhere in the lower federal judiciary. 
Overall, in the area of informal rulemaking, the leadership of the 
Court has been moderately effective. To the extent that Vermont Yan-
kee's lead has been ineffective in establishing the intended judicial role in 
the review of rulemaking, the reason may be the ambiguities of the deci-
sion itself as much as perceived arrogance or intransigence in the lower 
federal judiciary. Vermont Yankee left open not only the exceptions for 
constitutional contraints or extremely compelling circumstances, but also 
the possibility of remands when "the challenged rule finds [in]sufficient 
justification in the administrative proceedings that it should be upheld by 
the reviewing court."317 Although the exceptions do not appear to have 
been exploited to circumvent the Supreme Court's basic position, the exi-
gencies of judicial review have been invoked in some cases with that 
effect.318 
If the Supreme Court is inclined to implement the temper of Ver-
mont Yankee effectively and fully, it must develop these issues in future 
cases. It is not further refinement of the exceptions for constitutional 
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances that is needed, how-
ever, as much as development of the precise nature of the judiciary's role 
in judicial review of informal rulemaking. Otherwise, the plausible and 
readily accessible "gap" will remain available to courts inclined to resist 
Vermont Yankee. As has been noted, refinement, by the Supreme Court, 
of the principles of Vermont Yankee has been limited to date.319 
Where the leadership of Vermont Yankee perhaps has been most 
effective is in areas where it was least intended, if at all - in administra-
tive proceedings other than informal rulemaking. In courts throughout 
the lower federal judiciary, the case has been cited frequently in the con-
text of adjudicatory proceedings. Typically these courts have focused on 
Vermont Yankee's statement that procedures beyond those mandated by 
317. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978). 
318. See supra text accompanying notes 151-58 & 273-80. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 41-55. 
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statute are to be left to the discretion of the agencies, absent constitu-
tional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances. The clear im-
pression is that it has had impact in restraining judicial activism in 
review of administrative adjudication. The clear question is whether this 
was intended by the Supreme Court. 
One important consideration that influenced the Supreme Court, 
and caused it to stress that the circumstances justifying its position that 
exceptions would be "extremely rare,"320 was its fear that 
if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine 
whether the agency employed procedures which were, in the 
court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court per-
ceives to be the "best" or "correct" result, judicial review 
would be totally unpredictable. And the agencies, operating 
under this vague injunction to employ the "best" procedures 
and facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would undoubt-
edly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance. Not 
only would this totally disrupt the statutory scheme, through 
which Congress enacted "a formula upon which opposing so-
cial and political forces have come to rest. . ., but all the in-
herent advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally 
lost. 321 
The Court was not addressing the addition of procedural requirements in 
adjudication. There is no indication that it desired to preserve any idea 
of inherent advantages of informal adjudication. Yet the invocation of 
Vermont Yankee in such cases may have that unintended effect. 
This would not be especially disquieting were it not for the added 
dimension of the "consitutional constraints" exception that accompanies 
the call for judicial restraint. In rulemaking, the idea that due process is 
relevant only in the unusual case is traditional and unremarkable. As the 
D.C. Circuit observed in one case citing Vermont Yankee, "when a pro-
ceeding is classified as rulemaking, due process ordinarily does not de-
mand procedures more rigorous than those provided by Congress."322 It 
is quite correct then, to consider the "constitutional constraints" excep-
tion an "extremely rare" occurrence. In contrast, there is nothing "ex-
tremely rare" in an active concept of due process in administrative 
adjudication, formal or informal. 
The frequent adoption of the principles of Vermont Yankee in adju-
dication cases carries with it the suspicion that the effect may be to im-
pede the rigor of constitutional analysis in cases in which traditional 
notions of due process are both legitimate and due. This can be allevi-
ated in two ways. The lower federal judiciary shoula be alert to the fact 
320. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
321. [d. at 546-47 (emphasis added). 
322. Association of Nat'} Advertisers, Inc. v. FfC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). 
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that Vermont Yankee focused on added procedures in rulemaking and 
not in adjudication; thus, it should not be taken as an added impediment 
to the imposition of additional procedures in adjudication on constitu-
tional grounds. 323 Second, the Supreme Court should clarify its stand on 
the relationship between Vermont Yankee and administrative action be-
yond the sphere of administrative rulemaking. 
Consequently, in both rulemaking and adjudication, the lower fed-
eral judiciary needs further guidance from the Supreme Court on the 
meaning of Vermont Yankee. One hopes that it will be forthcoming in 
the not too distant future. 
323. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851-56 (E.D. Va. 1981), 
provides'an example of an informal adjudication in which a court cognizant of Ver-
mont Yankee was nonetheless uninhibited in its due process analysis. 
